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I. INTRODUCTION
N AN IDEAL WORLD there would be no disputes. In the real
world, disputes are inevitable. Sometimes disputes are neces-
sary, can be productive, and can even help improve certain situ-
ations. At other times they can be counterproductive, can ruin
business relationships, or even be destructive. The fight for sub-
sidies in the commercial jetliner industry between Airbus and
Boeing could be one of those destructive disputes. Except for
subsidies concerning the agricultural sector, "[i]n no other in-
dustry has the subsidies question been more contentious than in
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aircraft manufacturing."1 The dispute over subsidies between
Airbus Industries and Boeing, which has continued for more
than two decades, is the biggest commercial dispute between the
United States and the European Community and its member
States ("EC"), 2 and one of the most intractable. -
The threat to involve the World Trade Organization ("WTO")
in this long lasting subsidy dispute has arisen many times before,
but this time, on October 6, 2004, the United States actually ini-
tiated the first stage of dispute settlement proceedings before
the WTO by requesting consultations with the EC.4 Following
the United States' complaint to the WTO, the EC and its mem-
ber states responded by requesting consultations on alleged
United States subsidies to Boeing.'
This subsidy battle between Airbus and Boeing could be the
most expensive case ever to come before the WTO. As Peter
Mandelson, the European trade commissioner, stated,
"America's decision will, I fear, spark probably the biggest, most
difficult and costly legal dispute in the WTO's history."6 By in-
volving the WTO and requesting the establishment of a dispute
settlement panel, this showdown has not only huge stakes for
the companies at hand, but also could create acrimony and sour
relations between the EC and the United States and even dam-
age the WTO. 7 Moreover, bringing the dispute to the WTO
could affect global trade by creating specific problems concern-
ing the Doha Round of trade negotiations, which, in the worst
case scenario, could result in a trade war between the United
States and the EC.
This paper examines the effectiveness of the WTO dispute set-
tlement procedure in Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft between Airbus and Boeing and assesses the possible
1 Shane Spradlin, The Aircraft Subsidies Dispute in the GA17I"s Uruguay Round, 60
J. AIR L. & CoM. 1191, 1193 (1995).
2 EC in the following text refers to the European Community and its member
States and also relates to the European Union.
3 International Trade: An Ill-Timed Spat, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 59.
4 Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Mea-
sures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 12, 2004).
5 Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States-Mea-
sures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 12, 2004).
6 David Gow, Snubbed Mandelson Takes BoeingFight to WTO, THE GUARDIAN,June
1, 2005, at 19.
7 Ian Townsend, Economic Indicators ii - xi: (House of Commons Library Re-




outcomes and effects of the WTO's forthcoming decision. This
article will argue that the WTO is not the appropriate forum to
settle this dispute as the WTO is not equipped to handle such a
large and highly "political" case between its leading powers.
This article will also show that by ruling on this case, the legiti-
macy and credibility of the WTO will likely be threatened, espe-
cially due to potential compliance issues.
Part II of this article briefly explains the different trade para-
digms of the United States and Europe. Part III reviews the ori-
gins of the trade dispute between Airbus and Boeing, including
an assessment of the agreements that cover subsidies in the air-
craft manufacturing sector. Part IV delves into the claims that
the parties have filed with the WTO. Part V then examines the
effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement procedure, examin-
ing the different stages of the dispute settlement system and
highlighting the areas that are most likely to cause problems.
This section includes an evaluation of whether the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism will be able to cope with the large-scale
and highly complex dispute between Airbus and Boeing, and
also whether the WTO is the appropriate forum. Part V also
discusses what a decision made by the WTO might look like,
which party would profit the most from a ruling, and whether
the parties are likely to comply with a decision issued by the
WTO. Finally, this paper explores potential points for improve-
ment in the WTO dispute settlement system and searches for
alternative solutions that might resolve this dispute for good.
II. TWO DIFFERENT TRADE PARADIGMS
The EC and the United States represent the two largest eco-
nomic trading blocs in the world.' Civil aviation is the largest
export industry in the United States, and Boeing, which controls
nearly one hundred percent of the United States civil aviation
manufacturing industry, is the largest exporting manufacturer
in the United States and the world. Moreover, Boeing is one of
the world's most recognizable and valuable brands. Boeing is a
dominant force in the United States industrial market since air-
craft production affects nearly eighty percent of the United
States economy." Airbus occupies a similar economic and geo-
8 Michael j. Levick, The Production of Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of Two World
Giants, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 434, 434 (1993).
9 Id.
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political place in the European economy.' ° However, the
United States and the EC have very different market philoso-
phies, which is illustrated by their attitudes towards
subsidization. 11
European political systems have traditionally mingled public
and private sectors. This tradition dates back to Europe's emer-
gence from the Second World War when massive government
support was needed to rebuild Europe's torn economy. 12 This
attitude towards subsidization and government involvement in
industry is still seen in the EC. Most subsidization takes the
form of direct relief, largely in the form of direct grants and tax
concessions.13
In the United States, government encroachment is seen as
suspicious and is only acceptable under rare circumstances, such
as in times of emergency. The perception in the United States is
that subsidization is an intrusion on free market principles.
Conversely, the EC perceives limits on domestic subsidies as in-
terference with the responsibility and rights of national govern-
ments. Thus, behind the Boeing - Airbus dispute are the
competing ideologies of liberal, free-enterprise America, and
state-supported Europe. 4
In this context, the United States' policy has been guided by a
political philosophy that presumes subsidies distort resource al-
locations, influence international trade flows, and flout the law
of comparative advantage by enabling the survival of otherwise
uncompetitive industries.' 5 Due to this political climate and the
concept of free-market economics, direct aid to industry in the
United States is a very sensitive issue. 6 Throughout the history
of Airbus Industries, financial support provided by European
governments for the creation and, more importantly, operation
of the company has been a major point of dispute between the
10 Daniel I. Fisher, "Super Jumbo" Problem: Boeing Airbus, and the Battle for the
Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 867 (2002); STEVEN McGuiiE,
AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN US-EC TRADE RELATIONS 2
(1997).
ii Levick, supra note 8, at 448.
12 Spradlin, supra note 1, at 1197.
13 Levick, supra note 8, at 438.
14 STEPHEN ARIS, CLOSE TO THE SUN: How AIRBUS CHALLENGED AMERICA'S DOM-
INATION OF THE SKIES 151 (Aurum 2002).
15 Spradlin, supra note 1, at 1197.
16 Levick, supra note 8, at 439.
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United States and Europe.' 7 Accordingly, this long-running
case over government support reflects a "clash of philosophies
about the limits of state intervention."'" As will be seen in the
following section, the negotiations between the United States
and the EC over aircraft subsidies reflect the parties' differing
trade paradigms and make reconciliation more difficult.'
III. AGREEMENTS GOVERNING AIRCRAFT SUBSIDIES
From the beginning, the United States made clear its view
that Europe's subsidies to Airbus were improper.2 0 The first
round of hostilities started in 1978 when Boeing accused Airbus
of predatory pricing in order to secure a deal with Eastern Air-
lines. " The United States referred the matter to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),22 complaining that
Airbus had arranged for European governments to extend $250
million of export credits to the cash-strapped airline. 2' From
this point on, the dispute was no longer a spat between two air-
craft manufacturers, but had become a government-to-govern-
ment matter.
24
In order to entirely understand this dispute, which was re-
vived in 2004, this article reviews several agreements that govern
aircraft subsidies.
A. THE GATT ToKYo ROUND
The Tokyo Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade lasted from 1973 until 1979. It was signed at the end of
the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft,25 which was the sub-
ject of much controversy. The agreement was ambiguous in
many parts, did not include clear rules covering aircraft subsi-
17 Richard O'Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production: New WJO
Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of U.S.-E. U. Dispute, 14
AIR & SPACE L. 4, 4 (1999).
I ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, TRADE DISPUTES IN THE COMMERCIAL AIR-
CRAFT INDUSTRY: A BACKGROUND NOTE 5 (2005), available at http://wv,.raes.org.
uk/raes/pdfs/TradeWarFull.pdf.
19 Spradlin, supra note 1, at 1199.
20 O'Cunningham, supra note 17, at 5.
21 ARIS, supra note 14, at 154.
22 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55U.N.T.S. 194.
2 ARIS, supra note 14, at 154.
24 Id.
25 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 619, T.I.A.S.
No. 9620, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/air-79-e.pdf.
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dies, and in the end, served more as a general declaration of
principles than a specific enforceable document.26
The question the GATT Tokyo Round sought to resolve was
how much government support should be allowed under GATT
rules to ensure that the guiding principles of free trade and free
competition were not unduly compromised. 27 "[Tlhe language
restricting European practices [though] was left extremely
vague and almost unenforceable. 28 One of the main problems
was that the agreement did not define the term "subsidy," and
merely provided a list of permissible subsidies based on actions
and objectives. While the agreement brought aircraft subsidies
into the overall GATT framework, they were not banned as
such.29 This was due to the fact that the subject matter of subsi-
dies was fairly new to the parties involved and subsidies were
widely seen as having largely positive effects. Accordingly, in the
main GATT Agreement, domestic subsidies were permitted and
it was even noted that such subsidies were "widely used as impor-
tant instruments for the promotion of social and economic pol-
icy objectives."" ° The subsidy practices that had given Airbus an
advantage were not addressed substantively in the GATT Tokyo
Round."'
B. THE 1992 CIVIL AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT
Despite the 1979 multilateral agreement reached during the
Tokyo Round, trade tensions over civil aircraft continued be-
tween the United States and Europe. 2 Airbus's penetration of
the United States market and key foreign markets in the late
1970s to 1990s raised the political and domestic pressure on the
United States government to limit subsidies. 3
26 Fisher, supra note 10, at 873; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF US-EUROPEAN UNION AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT UN-
CERTAIN 7 (1994), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1995/gg95045.pdf
[hereinafter LONG-TERM VIAILITvY].
27 MATTHEW LYNN, BIRDS OF PREY 155 (1997).
28 Levick, supra note 8, at 449.
29 ARIs, supra note 14, at 155.
30 Agreement in Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 11(1), Nov. 6, 1979.
31 Fisher, supra note 10, at 873; Robert Carbaugh &John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus
Subsidy Dispute: An Economic and Trade Perspective, 2 GLOBAL ECON. Q. 261, 265
(2001).
32 LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 26, at 2.
33 Fisher, supra note 10, at 874.
198
W'O'S "TOUGHEST" CASE
In July 1992, the EC and the United States signed the Agree-
ment on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft. 4 The agreement recog-
nizes that the GATT Civil Aircraft Code of 1979 "should be
strengthened with a view toward progressively reducing the role
of government support. ''1 5 The bilateral Agreement on Trade
in Large Civil Aircraft clarifies and expands the application of
the "plurilateral" agreement of 1979.' It includes several struc-
tural changes to world trade law that limit or cap the use of sub-
sidies. The key point of the agreement is the amount of an
aircraft's development costs that may be financed by
government.1
7
First, the agreement provides for a ban on all future produc-
tion subsidies and a limit on development subsidies at thirty-
three percent of total cost." Second, it limits indirect subsidies
to three percent of the turnover of civil aircraft manufacturers
or four percent of their value in civilian sales.3 ' Third, trade
officials are explicitly barred from pressuring the governments
of trading partners to purchase aircraft." Finally, it increases
reporting requirements by setting up a bilateral panel that
monitors compliance and increases the transparency of the
commercial aircraft industry.4 The bilateral agreement is not
self-enforcing and the remedy of one party for the other's viola-
tion is termination of the agreement. The agreement reached
by the parties also does not preclude either party from taking
subsidiary or other issues to WTO dispute resolution.
In order to classify the agreement, it is important to under-
stand the dynamics of the negotiations that led up to the agree-
ment between the parties. Due to Airbus's growing success,
34 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the European Economic Community Concerning the Application of the GATT
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (1992),
available at http://wwxv.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/inform/usaeulca.pdf [herein-
after The 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement].
3- Id. pmbl. para. 3.
36 David Pritchard & Alan MacPherson, The Trade and Employment limplications of
a New Aircraft Launch: The Case of the Boeing 717, 1, 5 (Canada-United States Trade
Center, Occasional Paper No. 28, 2003).
17 Fisher, supra note 10, at 875; John Olienyk & Robert Carbaugh, Competition
in the World Jetliner Industry, 42 CHALLENG.E 60, 65 (1999).





42 O'Cunningham, supra note 17, at 6.
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pressure on the United States government increased in the
1980s and 1990s. Accordingly, the United States turned to
GATT to limit Airbus subsidies.43 The EC was afraid that the
Airbus dispute was adversely impacting the overall EC-United
States relationship and thus requested the negotiation of a bilat-
eral agreement, rather than proceeding with GATT dispute res-
olution.4 4 The negotiations did not intend to achieve "balance"
between the indirect United States supports and European sup-
ports, but rather sought to determine whether limits on future
European subsidization could be devised that would be suffi-
cient for the United States to stop pursuing a GATT remedy.45
The 1992 subsidy agreement, therefore, can be seen as a politi-
cal compromise that had little economic foundation.46
The American benefits included that the EC had to agree to
force Airbus to repay cash advances at the market rate of inter-
est which was higher than the common practice, and that future
production subsidies were banned. The Europeans also gained
because, for the first time, the Americans accepted that indirect
subsidies from the United States Department of Defense and
NASA came under "international discipline," which became an
explicit part of the agreement. 47
However, in many parts of the agreement, the parties could
not agree on important points and refrained from defining sub-
stantial and decisive terms. More importantly, the agreement,
like the 1979 Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, failed to de-
fine a "subsidy" or what actions constitute "government sup-
port."48  Furthermore, "the agreement does not contain a
formal dispute settlement mechanism, but rather calls for con-
sultations between the two parties when there is a disagree-
ment."49 "Thus, the effectiveness of the agreement depends on
the two parties acting in good faith to implement their commit-
ments."5 The agreement provides that both parties "shall make
their utmost efforts to ensure that these or similar disciplines
43 Id. at 4.
44 De Melo, supra note 38, at 22.
45 McGUIRE, supra note 10, at 157; DAVID WELDON THORNTON, AIRBUS INDUS-
TRIE-THE POLITICS OF AN INTERNATIONAL INDUSTRIAL COLLABORATION 146
(1995); O'Cunningham, supra note 17, at 5.
46 Claude E. Barfield, Avoiding an Air War (Oct. 20, 2004), http://www.aei.org/
include/pubprint.asp; Carbaugh & Olienyk, supra note 31, at 276.
47 LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 26, at 15.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 5.
50 Id. at 15.
200
WFO'S "TOUGHEST" CASE
are incorporated into the GATT Aircraft Code."5 1 However, an
agreement to replace the 1979 Agreement on Trade in Civil Air-
craft was not reached until recently.
Due to the problems mentioned above and many other un-
resolved issues concerning the 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement,
the agreement has not eliminated the dispute over aircraft subsi-
dies. In October 2004, the United States terminated the 1992
Civil Aircraft Agreement, alleging that the Europeans had vio-
lated the agreement by providing illegal subsidies to Airbus.52
C. THE URUGUAY ROUND
The GATT civil aircraft committee agreed to renegotiate the
GATT Aircraft Code as part of the Uruguay Round.5 ' The Uru-
guay Round agreement was entered into on December 15, 1994;
however, it "did not include a new agreement on civil aircraft. 54
Still, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(the "SCM Agreement") 55 was established under the Uruguay
Round.
1. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Due to the fact that the airline industry has had an unusual
history of government sponsorship, the founders of the WTO
envisioned special rules to govern aircraft subsidies. That is why
a footnote in the global trade body's formative agreement on
subsidies was included, indicating that the WTO should recog-
nize the outcome of industry talks on the rules. Other footnotes
note some of the major concerns of the industry that are re-
flected in the 1992 Agreement, which remains in force until par-
ties agree to a successor to the 1979 Agreement.5 6 Although the
footnotes did not affect the ratification of the SCM Agreement,
talks between the United States and the EC concerning a new
agreement dealing with subsidies in the aircraft manufacturing
51 The 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement, supra note 34, art. 12, 2.
52 RobertJ. Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: A Sequel, 4
GLOBAL ECON. Q. 1, 3 (2004).
53 Levick, supra note 8, at 461.
54 LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 26, at 42.
55 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, availa-
ble at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/24-scm.pdf [hereinafter
ASCM].
56 EUROPEAN ASSOC. OF AEROSPACE INDUS., EUROPEAN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
TRADE ISSUES (2002), available at http://www.aecma.org/Position/Tradejan02.
pdf.
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sector were not successful, leaving only the footnote with the
intent to agree on a special aircraft subsidies code.57 Accord-
ingly, the SCM Agreement does not specifically deal with the
issue of large commercial aircraft.18 As a result, there are only
"broad subsidy rules that were never [really] intended for air-
craft manufacturers. 59
Nevertheless, the SCM Agreement established a new disci-
pline on domestic subsidies. Unlike the old GATT Code, the
new WTO Code defines what constitutes a subsidy, and the SCM
Agreement is an integral part of the WTO Agreement.6 ° Ac-
cording to the new agreement, a subsidy exists where "there is a
financial contribution by a government" and "a benefit is
thereby conferred."'6 1 A financial contribution may occur by
means of a direct transfer of funds, such as grants or loans, a
potential transfer of funds, or a government making payments
to a funding mechanism.6 2 A benefit includes some notion of
an advantage to the recipient.63
Under this definition, money or anything else of value pro-
vided to a manufacturer or exporter at a lower cost than would
have been charged in a commercial transaction is considered to
be a subsidy. Furthermore, exchange rate guarantees, debt for-
giveness, or export credits are seen as subsidies when provided
on terms more favorable than those obtainable from commer-
cial sources.64 The basic principle is that a subsidy that distorts
the allocation of resources within an economy should be subject
to restriction. Consequently, not just direct payments, but also
indirect support such as benefits from research and defense pro-
57 David Nicklaus, Boeing and Airbus Turn up the Heat in Fight over Funding, ST.
Louis TODAY, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.stltoday.com (last visited Aug.
15, 2005).
58 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 6.
59 Nose to Nose - Boeing v. Airbus, ECONOMIST, June 25, 2005, at 67, 69; Scott
Miller, Airplane Battle Spotlights Power of a Quirky Court, WALL ST. J.,June 1, 2005, at
Al.
60 Peggy A. Clarke, Jaques Bourgeois & Gary Horlick, WI'O Dispute Settlement
Practice Relating to Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in THE WTO DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 353, 353 (2004).
61 ASCM, supra note 55, art. 1.1(a)(1).
62 Anwarul Hoda & Rajeev Ahuja, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Mea-
sures: Need for Clarification and Improvement 1, 2 (Indian Council for Research on
Int'l Econ. Relations, Working Paper No. 101, 2003).
63 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Air-
craft, 154, WT/DS70/AB/R, (July 21, 2000).
64 O'Cunningham, supra note 17, at 6.
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grams can constitute a subsidy under certain conditions, as will
be explained below.
In general, this new agreement concerning subsidies ad-
dresses two separate but closely related topics. On one hand, it
addresses multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of
subsidies, and on the other hand, it addresses the use of coun-
tervailing measures to offset injury caused by subsidized im-
ports.'65 Countervailing duties are a unilateral instrument,
which may be applied by a member after an investigation by that
member and a determination that the criteria set forth in the
SCM Agreement are satisfied and can be challenged before the
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").
a. "Traffic Light Approach"
The obligations of Members regarding subsidies are laid
down by the SCM Agreement in what is known as the "traffic
light approach" - red, green, and yellow.6" While "red-light" sub-
sidies are prohibited in almost all circumstances, "green-light"
subsidies are permissible; subsidies falling into the category of
"yellow-light" subsidies are generally permissible, but actionable
in certain situations depending on their effects on trade."t7 The
SCM Agreement does not ban subsidies as such, but creates two
basic categories of subsidies, those that are prohibited and those
that are actionable."8 Prohibited subsidies include those that
are tied directly to exports and would necessarily have an effect
on foreign economies. Annex I of the SCM Agreement provides
further guidance in determining whether a subsidy is a prohib-
ited export subsidy.
Under the SCM Agreement, subsidies are "actionable" when
they cause "adverse effects" on free trade. Parties can only seek
remediation on actionable subsidies. t 9 In cases where subsidies
are found to be prohibited, the remedy is repayment or removal
of the scheme."' In the Airbus-Boeing dispute, most of the alleg-
edly illegal subsidies fall in the category of "actionable" subsidies
65 Pritchard & MacPherson, supra note 36, at 6.
- Hoda & Ahlja, supra note 62, at 4.
67 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, POLICIES THAT DISTORT WORLD AGRICUL-
TURL TRAD: PRFVAI ENCE AND MAGNITUDE 1, 3 (2005).
68 j. Michael Showalter, A Cruel Trilemma: The Flawed Political Economy of Reme-
dies to WI'O Subsidies Disputes, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAI'L L. 587, 600 (2004); ROYAL
AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 7.
69 Showalter, supra note 68, at 601.
71 Pritchard & MacPherson, supra note 36, at 7.
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under the SCM Agreement. The task of the WTO in cases in-
volving complaints filed by the member nations is to evaluate
what constitutes a subsidy and to identify which subsidies are
illegal under the WTO rules.
b. Adverse Effects and Specificity
Questions of benefit and specificity are the key points with
regard to the SCM Agreement. The legality of subsidies is
largely assessed by looking at whether subsidies impose illegal
conditions or distort trade by causing adverse effects on free
trade.71 Also, the question of what constitutes a "financial con-
tribution" is very important because it is possible to take the
United States countervailing duty law ("CVD") into account in
order to assess what constitutes a subsidy under Article 1.1 of the
SCM Agreement.7 2 If the conditions as set out in the SCM
Agreement are met, the WTO can find not only direct subsidies,
but also indirect subsidies illegal under the SCM Agreement.
However, the WTO requires proof of damage and a measurable
injury to competitors before finding that government financial
assistance is a subsidy that causes adverse effects.73 Hence, the
WTO must take into account many issues before declaring mea-
sures inconsistent with the SCM Agreement.
2. New Dispute Settlement Procedure
As important as the newly introduced WTO subsidy disci-
plines are, an even more striking factor is the new WTO dispute
settlement procedure." Before the Uruguay Round, all deci-
sions on panel reports were required to be made by consensus
of the GATT members. Consequently, a losing party could
block the adoption of a panel report and condemn its subsidies
or other practices inconsistent with GATT.75 Under the new
Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU"), panel reports are
effective unless there is a consensus against the panel report.76
The WTO framework, including the Dispute Settlement Body
71 WTO to Probe Airbus-Boeing Aid, BLOOMBERG, June 20, 2005, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com.
72 Panel Report, United States - Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies,
WT/DS/194/R (June 29, 2001).
73 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 8.
74 O'Cunningham, supra note 17, at 7.
75 WTO SECRETARIAT, A HANDBOOK ON THE WTO DisPuTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
13 (2004).
76 Id. at 15.
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("DSB") and the Dispute Settlement Understanding, will be dis-
cussed in depth in Part V where the effectiveness of the WTO's
dispute settlement procedure is examined.
IV. FIGHTING FOR AIRCRAFT SUBSIDIES
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
Trade representatives from the EU and the United States en-
gaged in negotiations in the fall of 2004 in an attempt to modify
the 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement. Those negotiations failed,
and the United States withdrew from the agreement and sought
the involvement of the WTO by filing a request for
consultations.
A. THE COMPLAINT TO THE WTO FILED
BY THE UNITED STATES
On October 6, 2004, the United States requested consulta-
tions with the European Communities pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes ("DSU"), Article XXIII:1 of
the GATT 1994, and Articles 4, 7, and 30 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures with regard to Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft.77 Articles 4 and 7 of the
SCM Agreement deal with remedies and Article 30 relates to the
dispute settlement procedure. The United States asserts that
the EC provides subsidies to Airbus inconsistent with their obli-
gations under the SCM Agreement and the GATT 1994.
For the United States, launch aid to Airbus is at the center of
this dispute. According to the United States, this financing
method provides benefits to the recipient companies that would
otherwise not be commercially feasible. The non-commercial
terms of the financing include, according to American allega-
tions, no interest or interest at below-market rates and a condi-
tional repayment obligation that is tied to the success of the
aircraft model being financed, and if a model is not successful,
some or all of the financing is forgiven.78 Boeing claims this so-
called launch aid that Airbus receives is risk-free money that is
not equally available to Boeing and that Airbus has used this
advantage to develop a larger family of aircraft than would have
been possible if Airbus was required to finance its programs on
77 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 4.
78 Id.
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ordinary commercial terms.7" From the United States' perspec-
tive, this violates the principles of a free and competitive market
in which companies must accept the risk of failure in the market
place. Specifically, the United States is concerned that this
launch aid to Airbus appears to be an export subsidy in breach
of Articles 3.1 (a) and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement.
The subsidies that are the subject of the complaint filed by
the United States include those provided to fund the launch of
the entire family of Airbus products (A300 through A380). In
its WTO complaint, the United States specifically cites the subsi-
dization of the Airbus 380.80 In a press release, the United
States trade representative even spoke of the Airbus 380 as being
the most subsidized aircraft in history.8 '
The United States is concerned that the measures appear to
be causing adverse effects to their interest as provided in Article
5(a) of the SCM Agreement. It asserts that the measures are
specific subsidies within the meaning of Articles 1 and 2 of the
SCM Agreement; furthermore, an evaluation of all relevant eco-
nomic factors has shown that their effects are causing or threat-
ening to cause injury to the United States' civil aircraft
industry.8 2 The main issue is whether the financial assistance
provided to Airbus constitutes a "red-light" subsidy that is not
allowed because it causes adverse effects on trade. Finally, the
United States is concerned that the measures appear to be in-
consistent with Article XVI:I of GATT 1994.3 This provision re-
fers to signatories of GATT and their obligations.84
On May 31, 2005, the United States initiated the next step by
filing a request with the WTO for the establishment of a panel.8 5
With this, the United States requested the DSB to establish a




81 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case
Against EU Over Unfair Aircraft Subsidies (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/PressRoom/SectionIndex.html.
82 Request for Consultations by the United States, supra note 4.
83 Id.
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85 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Com-





B. THE EUROPEAN COUNTERCLAIM TO THE WTO
The EC filed a counterclaim on October 6, 2004, by request-
ing consultations with the United States. 7 In this WTO counter-
claim, the EC alleged that Boeing has been receiving illegal
government subsidies. At the heart of the European complaint
are tax benefits granted by the State of Washington and other
tax breaks and incentives to Boeing provided by Kansas,
Oklahoma, and various other states. The EC contends that these
tax incentives are inconsistent with the obligations of the United
States under Articles 3.1(a) and (b), Articles 5(a) and (c), and
Articles 6.3(a), (b) and (c) of the SCM Agreement, and Article
111:4 of GATT 1994.8
Moreover, the EC challenges "indirect" subsidies from the
United States military and NASA contracts, as well as research
development expenditures.8 "' Following the United States' re-
quest for the establishment of a panel on May 31, 2005, the EC
submitted a similar request the same day. The EC alleged that
the subsidies granted to Boeing violate Articles 3, 5, and 6 of the
SCM Agreement and Article 111:4 of GATT.9"
C. CLAIM AND COUNTERCLAIM
The core of the disagreement is that neither side is willing to
classify all the aid their respective companies receive as "subsi-
dies."'  In Boeing's view, Airbus benefited greatly from direct
assistance provided by European governments. Boeing argues
that several of Airbus's projects, especially the A380, could not
have been financed in commercial markets because of their
risk."z Airbus rejected Boeing's argument and countered that
Boeing benefited from huge indirect governmental subsidies in
the form of military and space contracts, as well as potential sup-
port from states and foreign governments.'" For example, the
87 Request for Consultations by European Communities, United States - Mea-
sures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 12, 2004).
88 Id.
88 Id.
90 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WA7T/DS317/2 (June
3, 2005).
91 Scott Miller & Lynn Lunsford, Subsidy Talks on Boeing, Airbus Pzil to Advance,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2004, at A13.
92 RAYMONDJ. AHFARN, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION TRAI)E RE-
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Japanese government provided financial support for the devel-
opment of the Boeing 787. Although Japan is not a party to the
1992 bilateral agreement, the EC considers the financial assis-
tance provided by the Japanese government to Boeing to be a
circumvention of the 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement between the
United States and Europe.9 4 According to Boeing, the EC
would need to file a separate WTO complaint if they were con-
cerned with aid provided to Boeing by Japan.95
There are several other reasons for the current crisis. They lie
largely in Boeing's steady loss of market share to Airbus and the
launch aid for the A350, which supposedly competes directly
with Boeing's 787.96 In sum, the current dispute centers on the
United States' charge that Europe provides direct launch aid
and other financial support to Airbus, and Europe's counter-
charge that the United States provides indirect subsidies to Boe-
ing. Because the WTO will have to evaluate the parties' claims,
the next part of this article examines the effectiveness of the
WTO's dispute settlement procedure.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE
"No other area of the [WTO] has received more attention
than its dispute settlement procedures. '97 An aerospace fight
between Boeing and Airbus over subsidies would severely test
the WTO dispute resolution process. 98 This part of the article
includes a brief overview of the general WTO framework, fol-
lowed by an analysis of the likely effectiveness of the WTO dis-
pute settlement procedure regarding Measures Affecting Trade
in Large Civil Aircraft between Airbus and Boeing.
94 Raphael Minder & Mariko Sanchanta, Japan Embroiled in EUUS Trade Row,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at 6.
95 Caroline Daniel & Raphael Minder, Boeing Says EC Concerns on Japan Aid
Would Require a Second WTO Complaint, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at 12.
96 Juliane von Reppert-Bismarck & William Echikson, EU Countersues over US
Aid to Boeing Escalating Trade War, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2005, at A2; RoYAL AERO-
NAUTICAL SocmTY, supra note 18, at 7.
97 J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the
Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REv. INT'L ARB.
177, 177 (2002).




A. THE GENERAL WTO FRAMEWORK
Today, more than ninety percent of the world's trade takes
place between the 148 member states of the WTO. Because of
this, the new WTO dispute settlement system quickly became
one of the most frequently utilized mechanisms for interna-
tional dispute resolution. 99
1. Transition from the GATT to the WTO Procedure
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the WTO dispute set-
tlement system, it is important to recognize the changes that re-
sulted from the Uruguay Round, because the WO dispute
settlement procedure substantially differs from that in GATT. 0°
There were numerous problems with GATT, but the most signif-
icant problem was the requirement of a consensus ruling for
approval of panel decisions.'' As mentioned above, the former
GATT consensus requirement for the establishment of a panel
and adoption of reports is reversed, meaning that consensus in
the WTO is required to reject, rather than to adopt the re-
port.'O2 In sum, the new WTO dispute settlement procedure has
a much more formalized and legalistic approach than the for-
mer GATT procedure and makes the dispute settlement resolu-
tion within the WTO much more effective.10 3
2. The DSB and the DSU
The WTO Agreements are enforced through a WTO-specific
dispute settlement system. 0 4 The Dispute Settlement Under-
standing ("DSU"), which constitutes Annex 2 of the WIG
Agreement, sets out the procedures and rules that define the
WORLD TRADE ORG., ANNUAL REPORT 2003 148, available at http://ww.wto.
org/english/res-e/booksp_e/anrep-e/anrep03-e.pdf; Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The
WTO's Legitimacy Crisis: Reflections on the Law and Politics of WTO Dispute Resolution,
13 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 197, 197 (2002).
100 Torsten Lorcher, WTO Dispute Settlement and Arbitration, 6 INT'L A.L.R. 203,
204 (2003).
101 Marc Kleiner, Bananas, Airplanes and the W'O: Prohibited Export Subsidies, 10
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 130 (2002).
102 Christopher Arup, The State of Play of Dispute Settlement "Law" at the World
Trade Organization, 37J. WORLD TRADE 897, 902 (2003); Showalter, supra note 68,
at 595.
1" WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 15; John H. Jackson, The WI'O Dispute
Settlement Understanding?Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation, 91 AM. J
INT'L L. 60, 63 (1997).
104 Showalter, supra note 68, at 590.
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WTO dispute settlement system. 10 5 The Dispute Settlement
Body ("DSB") is the plenary organ constituted of representatives
of all members of the WTO.10 6 Only the member governments
of the WTO may participate in the dispute settlement proce-
dure."°7 The DSB is authorized to administer the rules and pro-
cedures under the DSU, which gives the DSB oversight of the
entire dispute settlement process. 1 8 Hence, it has authority to
establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, and to
supervise the implementation of rulings. 1 9
B. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURE-
AN EFFECTIVE MECHANISM?
The most important question in the subsidy dispute between
Airbus and Boeing is whether the WTO is equipped to handle
this case. To answer this question, this section will highlight ar-
eas of the dispute settlement procedure that, due to the scale
and complexity of the Airbus-Boeing dispute, might break
down. This section also includes a prediction of how the WTO
might rule.
There are three main stages in the WTO dispute settlement
process: the consultation stage; the panel procedure, including
a possible appeal; and finally, the implementation of the ruling,
which includes the possibility of countermeasures in the event
of failure by the losing party to implement the ruling.110 "The
main dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO is the so-
called panel procedure." ''
The panel procedure is embedded in a framework before the
DSB. Within the panel procedure, the panels are in charge of
adjudicating disputes between Members in the first instance. 11 2
As will be shown, numerous problems throughout all stages of
the panel procedure will make it difficult for the WTO to man-
age the dispute between Airbus and Boeing.
105 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organ-
ization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M.
1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
106 Amelia Porges, The New Dispute Settlement: From the GAT to the WFO, 1075
PRACTICING L. INST. 1095, 1102 (1998).
107 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 9.
108 Id. at 17; Kleiner, supra note 101, at 130.
109 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 17.
110 Id. at 43.
M1 Lorcher, supra note 100, at 204.
112 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 21.
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I. The Consultation Stage
A request for consultations formally initiates a dispute in the
WTO and triggers the application of the DSU."'  A request for
consultations must be submitted in writing and must give rea-
sons for the request.' 4 Specifically, Article 4.4 of the DSU re-
quires that a request for consultation identify the measures at
issue and indicate the legal basis for the complaint. '1 5 It is a
fundamental principle for any legal procedure that the scope of
the procedure be clearly defined at the outset by the party initi-
ating the dispute in order to ensure that due process and the
rights of defence are preserved."" The problem that arises in
the consultation stage is the degree of clarity required in re-
questing consultations.' 17 "[ T] he current DSU fails to state how
clear complaints must be during the consultation stage.'''
"This is a substantial shortcoming of the entire DSU process,"
because "once claims go to a panel, parties cannot revise them
at a later time."' I)
As mentioned above, DSU Article 4.4 spells out the legal re-
quirements for making a request for consultations, and DSU Ar-
ticle 6.2 does the same for the panel process. "Within the
framework of Articles 4 and 6, DSU jurisprudence has listed
some important constraints as to how, when, and with what ef-
fect disputed issues are to be identified."'" Like the request for
consultations, the request for a panel must indicate whether
"consultations were held," identifying "the specific measures at
issue," and providing a "brief summary of the legal basis of the
complaint" that is "sufficient to present the problem clearly."' 2 '
The Appellate Body wishes to impose a hard procedural con-
'I" Id. at 45.
114 DSU, supra note 105, art. 4.4.
I15 Id.
Ilb Bernhard Jansen, Scope of Jurisdiction in GAT77TW-FO Dispute Settlement: Con-
sultations and Panel Requests, in IMPROVING NWTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES
45, 45 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000).
117 Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement Understanding of the 1VTO Agreement: An
Inadequate Mechanism for the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 2 PEPP. DIsp.
RESOi. L.J. 99, 104 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 104-05.
2( Gar, N. Horlick & Glenn R. BuItterton, A Problem of Process in WV1Ojurispru-
dence: Identifying Disputed Issues in Panels and Consultations, 31 L. & Po.'Y INT'L
Bus. 573, 576 (2000).
12, DSU, supra note 105, art. 6.2.
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straint and for that reason interprets the requirements of DSU
Article 6.2 narrowly. 122
The question is whether the same constraint and narrow in-
terpretation of DSU Article 6.2 applies to the consultation stage
as well. There is no requirement that all legal claims cited in a
panel request must have been raised during the consultations;
however, the parties must be very precise in the consultation
stage. 123 According to the Appellate Body, "[a]ll parties en-
gaged in dispute settlement under the DSU must be fully forth-
coming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved
in a dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims." 124 The
problem is that the consultation stage is compared to the heavily
formalized panel and appellate process, despite its informal na-
ture which aims to allow parties to gather information. 125 "In
this connection, the DSU provisions can create an atmosphere
in which discussions can evolve and parties can speak and ex-
plore ideas freely.' 26
Due to the Appellate Body's narrow interpretation of Article
6.2 of the DSU, the risk is that parties in the consultation stage
are guarded, and that the consultation stage is used as a mere
procedural phase in the panel process.' 27 Totally ignoring what
the parties say in the consultation stage could significantly un-
dermine the stage's role, but a rule that holds parties accounta-
ble for all they have said or not said in consultations will have a
negative effect on the consultation process as well.128 Recent de-
cisions of the Appellate Body suggest that the focus has moved
from what was discussed in the consultations to what was said in
the panel request. 129
122 Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agri-
cultural Chemical Products, & 89, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997).
123 Horlick & Butterton , supra note 120, at 579; Christopher Parlin, Operation
of Consultations, Deterrence, and Mediation, 31 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 571
(2000).
124 India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
supra note 122, at & 94.
125 Gary N. Horlick, The Consultation Phase of W'O Dispute Resolution: A Private
Practitioner's View, 32 INT'L LAW. 685, 691-92 (1998); Horlick & Butterton, supra
note 120, at 580.
126 Horlick & Butterton, supra note 120, at 581.
127 Hyun Chong Kim, The WTO Dispute Settlement Process: A Primer, 2 J. INr'L
ECON. L. 457, 462 (1999).
128 William J. Davey & Amelia Porges, Performance of the System 1. Consultations
and Deterrence, 32 INT'L LAw. 695, 697 (1998).
129 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, &
126, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Korea-Definitive
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The parties to the Airbus-Boeing dispute illustrate this weak-
ness in the dispute settlement procedure by quarrelling over the
clarity of the other's request for consultations. One can already
conclude that the consultation stage, which should be used to
discuss the claims asserted and possibly settle the dispute before
it reaches the panel stage, creates a major area of contention in
the Airbus-Boeing dispute.
2. The Panel Procedure
As previously discussed, the initiation of panel proceedings re-
quires the complaining party to first request consultations. If
consultations take place but negotiations fail within sixty days,
the complaining party is entitled to requcst the establishment of
a panel. 3 " On October 6, 2004, the United States requested
consultations with the EC; the EC likewise filed a counterclaim
on the same day. Consultations were held on November 5,
2004, and were not successful. On May 31, 2005, both parties
requested the establishment of a panel.
a. Establishment of a Panel
The request for the establishment of a panel initiates the adju-
dication phase. 3 ' As already indicated, the content of the re-
quest for establishment of the panel is crucial. Under Article
7.1 of the DSU, the request determines the standard terms of
reference for the panel's examination of the matter. In other
words, the request for the establishment defines and limits the
scope of the dispute and thereby the extent of the panel's juris-
diction. 132 Only the measures identified in the request become
the object of the panel's review. All legal claims must be speci-
fied in the request for the establishment of a panel. If the initial
request does not specify a certain claim, the request cannot sub-
sequently be "cured." 3 3
Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products, & 139, WT/DS98/AB/R
(Dec. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concern-
ing Meat and Meat Products, & 155, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16,
1998).
1l DSU, supra note 105, art. 4.7.
131 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, 48.
1.5n Id.
13 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, & 143, W'T/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); WTO
SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 49.
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Establishing panels is one of the DSB's functions. When the
request is considered, any member may block the creation of a
panel. If a blocked request is placed on the DSB's agenda a
second time, the panel must be established unless the DSB de-
cides by consensus to the contrary. 34 If a panel is not blocked,
it will be established within approximately ninety days of the ini-
tial request for consultations.1 35 On June 13, 2005, the United
States and the EC both blocked each other's requests to create
panels to investigate illegal subsidies allegedly paid to Airbus
and Boeing. 1
36
Concerning the request for consultations initiated by the
United States, the EC stated that WTO Agreements would not
allow Members to bring cases against perceived threats of sub-
sidisation.'37 "Moreover, the EC stated that consultations had
not and could have not been held on a non-existent measure
raising questions about the real motives of the United States.' '1 38
They also "added that consultations had not been held on a
number of the challenged measures and that the United States'
request was framed broadly making it difficult to understand
what the claims of the Americans were."' 39 The EC concluded
that, "in light of the foregoing, it could not accept the establish-
ment of a panel at the current meeting of the DSB."'4 °
The United States alleged that the EC's panel request was de-
fective and did not meet the requirements spelled out in the
DSU. Mainly, it stated that of the twenty-eight subsidy programs
listed in the panel request, thirteen had not been the subject of
consultations between the parties. Consequently, the request by
the EC to establish a panel was deferred by the DSB. 14 '
The uncertainty about the clarity required in the request for
consultations and about what issues were raised during the con-
sultations proved to be a major issue of disagreement between
the parties, deferred the establishment of a panel, and is likely
to lead to even more contention once a panel is established.
134 DSU, supra note 105, art. 6.1.
135 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 49.
16 WTO News Item, EC and US Block Each Other's First Requests for Panels









On July 20, 2005, after the United States and the EC went
forward with their second requests, the DSB set tip two panels
4 2
to examine the claims made by the parties."' Thus, in the end,
there will be two separate rulings in this case, with two possible
losers or winners. 1
44
b. Problems Concerning the Composition of a Panel
"Composition of the panel is one of the most important as-
pects of any WTO dispute."' 4 5 The establishment and especially
the selection of a mutually acceptable panel is likely to become
heavily disputed in this case and may become a major obstacle if
suitable persons cannot be found to sit on the panels.
Panels are usually composed of three panelists, unless the par-
ties agree to five. 146 There is no permanent panel at the WATO;
rather, a different panel is composed for each dispute on an ad
hoc basis.' 4 7 Under WATO procedures, the WTO staff offers par-
ties prospective candidates to hear the dispute. 48 The WTO
Secretariat maintains an indicative list of names, from which
panelists may be drawn. "' The panelists have to be "well-quali-
fied" and are not allowed to be from a nation that is a party to
the dispute. 51
Parties have increasingly used the DSU rules to reject panel-
ists.15 If parties do not agree on panelists within twenty days of
the establishment of the panel, either party may request the Di-
142 See id.; Bradley S. Klapper, WITO Creates Panelsfor Illegal Subsidies, ABC NEWS,
July 20, 2005, http://wv.abcnews.go.coin/Business/print?id=958274; Nun doch
Schiedsgerichte im Subventionsstreit, FRANKFURTER AL(;EMEINE ZEITUNG, July 20,
2005, available at http://wvv.faz.inet.
143 WTO Probes EU-US Air Trade Battle, BBC Ntws, July 21, 2005, http://newvs.
bbc.co.ik/2/hi/bisi ness/4699373.stn; WFO Probe into Airbus, Boeing, CNN. :ov,
july 20, 2005, http://wwv.edition.cnn.com/2005/Business/07/20/wvto.planes.
rent/.
144 Stephen Evans, Who ll1' Win the US-EU Trade War?, BBC NEws,.June 1, 2005,
http://\\T.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4598711.stm.
145 Daniel W. Layton &,Jorge 0. Miranda, Advocacy Before the World Trade Organ-
ization Dispute Settlement Panels in Trade Jemedy Cases, 37 J. WORLD TPADE 69, 79
(2003).
146 Id.
147 TO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 21.
148 DSU, supra not 105, art. 8.6.
149 WTO SECRETARIAT, sulpra note 75, at 51.
1-51 DSU, supra note 105, art. 8.1.
151 Lawrence D. Roberts, Beyond Notions of Diplomacy and Legalism: Building a
Just Mechanism for 14/TO Dispute Resolution, 40 ANi. Bus. L.J. 511, 544 (2003).
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rector-General to name the panelists. 5 2 Over time, it has be-
come more common for the Director-General to appoint the
panel.15 Approximately eighty percent of the time, the selec-
tion of the panelists falls to the Director-General. 154 Finding
qualified panelists that the parties agree on has been a difficult
job in the past and will become even more difficult in the fu-
ture. Nearly a third of the 303 panel positions in the WTO's
history have gone to citizens of just four countries: Switzerland,
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. 155 According to WTO Sec-
retary-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, the lists of people who
are supposed experts in certain areas are nearly exhausted. 156
The panelists work on a sessional and rotational basis and are
not full-time judicial officers; however, by no means is their ex-
perience confined to law.1 57 Due to the complexity of the issues,
which would challenge even aviation experts,15 it will be very
difficult for the United States and the EC to agree on panelists.
Agreeing who should sit on each panel could take months. 59
Although panelists should be selected to ensure the indepen-
dence of the panel, lobbying and exertion of influence on the
panelists during the panel procedure and the composition
phase will undeniably exist in this highly political case. There is
a danger that winning the "race" to the panelists, rather than
whose arguments are most persuasive, will determine the out-
come of the case.
Three rounds of names have been presented to the parties,
but as of September 6, 2005, the EC and the United States could
not reach a consensus; therefore, the panelists that will sit on
the two panels are expected to be appointed by the WTO Direc-
tor- General.1 60
152 DSU, supra note 105, art. 8.7.
'53 William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT
AND THE MILLENNIUM 123 (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 1999).
154 Miller, supra note 59, at Al; Roberts, supra note 152, at 543.
155 Id.
156 Miller, supra note 59, at Al.
57 Arup, supra note 102, at 912.
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SPIEGEL ONLINE, June 6, 2005, http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/
spiegel/0,1518,359407,00.html.
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http://www.news.bbc.co.uk.
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c. The Panel Process Itself
Not only is the establishment and the composition of the
panel problematic, but there are various problems in the panel
process itself that will be difficult to overcome in the Airbus-Boe-
ing dispute. After giving a brief overview of the panel process
itself, the next part of this article draws attention to the areas in
the panel stage that are likely to become particularly problem-
atic in this dispute.
Once established and composed, a panel exists as a collegial
body and starts its work.'61 The procedure is primarily set out in
DSU Article 12 and Appendix 3. Following the panel formation,
each party to the dispute offers written submissions to the Secre-
tariat, who transmits them to the panel and the other disputing
members. 62 After the first written submissions are exchanged,
there is a first oral hearing. Following oral statements, the par-
ties respond to questions from the panel in order to clarify the
legal and factual issues. 11 3 After the hearings conclude, the
panel begins internal deliberations, reviews the matter, and
makes an objective assessment of the relevant factual questions
and legal issues.'" 4 The objectives of a panel are to strike a bal-
ance between member interests in protecting their sovereignty
and the general interest in achieving uniformity and correctness
of WTO law, and assess whether the respondent has acted incon-
sistently with its WTO obligations.15
The panel issues an interim report before the final report is
submitted. The interim report is the first substantial indication
the parties receive as to the likely outcome of the final panel
report and is designed for a reconsideration of precise aspects
of the panel report. The final panel report should be submitted
to the parties within two weeks of the interim review. Once is-
sued, panel reports are considered for adoption by the DSB.
"Unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the panel
report or one of the parties appeals the report, it is automati-
cally adopted within 60 days of its issuance.' 16
161 WTO SECRETARIAT, sufra note 75, at 53.
162 DSU, supra note 105, art. 12.6.
163 DSU, supra note 105, app. 3 & 8.
'64 DSU, supra note 105, art. 11.
165 WTO SECRETARIAr, supra note 75, at 56.
166 Andrew Guzman & Beth A. Simmons, To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical
Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 205, 207 (2002).
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i. Adherence to the Timeframe
In order to ensure that panel proceedings within the WTO
are conducted quickly and efficiently, the applicable provisions
provide for a detailed timeframe. 167 The period between the ac-
tual formation of the panel and the adoption of the report, not
including the time for a possible appeal, should not exceed one
year. 68 An initial ruling in the case between Airbus and Boeing
will take at least nine months.'69 The parties' written submis-
sions are complex documents, sometimes of considerable
length, and often include elaborate annexes. 7 ° With the panel-
ists unlikely to be aviation experts, and even for those who are
experts in the field, it will be a challenge to read through the
enormous amount of documents that will be produced; there-
fore, it might take quite some time for a decision to be reached
by the panelists. As previously discussed, agreeing on the panel-
ists could take months; consequently, it is uncertain if the sug-
gested timeframe of one year can be adhered to in the Airbus-
Boeing case. 171
Even if the panels are given additional time to issue their rul-
ings, which, for example, happened in the Biotech case 172 due
to the unusually large number of issues, the fact that there is no
agreement dealing with this issue suggests that it will be a long
time before the panelists reach a conclusion. As long as there is
no decision by the WTO or a new agreement between the par-
ties, the parties will continue to subsidize, as illustrated by the
fact that the EC is considering granting launch aid for the
A350.173 Furthermore, the longer the case continues, the longer
the two aircraft makers will operate under uncertainty regarding
the outcome. The longer the dispute lasts, the more the trust of
the parties involved in this dispute and other Member nations
167 DSU, supra note 105, arts. 12-18, app. 3.
168 Lorcher, supra note 100, at 206.
169 WTO to Probe Airbus-Boeing Aid, BLOOMBERG, July 20, 2005, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000085&sid=aXxv37zOi6Ns.
170 WTO SECRETARIAT, supra note 75, at 54.
17 Edward Fenell, A Battle for Business Minds, TIMES ONLINE, June 7, 2005,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk; Von Reppert-Bismarck & Echikson, supra note 96,
at A2; Kyle Wingfield, A World Without Subsidies-Fright or Flight?, WALL ST. J. ON-
LINE, June 15, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/home/us.
172 Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities-
Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/29,
WTrr/DS292/23, WT/DS293/23 (Aug. 15, 2005).
1"' Warwick, supra note 161; Oh for the Wings of an A350 Airbus, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
6, 2005, at 18.
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will decline in the WTO as a fast and efficient mechanism for
resolution of trade dispute.
H. Dissonance Between Diplomatic and Legal Cultures
Concerning the panel procedure itself, there seems to be a
"dissonance" between the diplomatic and legal cultures within
the WTO dispute settlement system.' 7 4 Under GATT, trade dis-
putes were understood as technical matters best handled by
trade diplomats in confidential proceedings.115 As shown above,
the Uruguay Round agreements, particularly the DSU, heralded
a shift to a more legalistic approach. The individuals at the
ANTO, the delegates, staff and most importantly the panelists
seem to have failed to internalize the attitudinal change that
should accompany this shift from a political to a more legalistic
approach to dispute resolution. 7 ' Although the system is now
supposed to be highly legalistic, echoes of the diplomatic atti-
tude remain. "For example, panelists are selected in an ad hoc
manner; they are not called judges,' the Appellate Body is not
called a 'court,' and there is a desire to keep dispute settlement
proceedings private."'17 7 The provisions of the DSU do little to
encourage transparency in the panel process. 178 Panel delibera-
tions are confidential, and the final panel opinions are ex-
pressed without any indication of the individual contribution of
the panel members.17 1 In terms of the profiles of panelists, the
rosters have changed only slightly to reflect the new more legal-
istic approach. 8 ' The new panel procedure might have en-
hanced the internal legitimacy of the system, but the external
legitimacy of the dispute settlement has not improved.' 8 '
As has just been shown, there are shortcomings in nearly
every stage of the panel procedure that are likely to create con-
siderable difficulties in the Airbus-Boeing case. In particular,
the search for suitable panelists and the lack of transparency
within the WTO dispute settlement system will almost inevitably
lead to problems in the Airbus-Boeing dispute. Considering the
174 Dunoff, supra note 99, at 198; Weiler, supra note 97, at 189.
175 Dunoff, supra note 99, at 198.
176 ld.
177 Id.
178 Roberts, supra note 151, at 541; Linda Silberman, International Arbitration:
Comments from a Critic, 13 A-m. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 17 (2002).
179 DSU, supra note 105, art. 14.
181) Weiler, supra note 97, at 189.
I'l Dunoff, supra note 99, at 199.
2006] 219
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
importance of the outcome of the rulings for the parties in this
case, the above-discussed dissonance between the diplomatic
and legal cultures which still exists within the WTO seem to
make it particularly difficult in this high-profile case to reach a
decision that will be accepted and followed on both sides of the
Atlantic. Together with the fact that the public cannot witness
any of the proceedings, the remaining diplomatic ethos within
the WTO dispute settlement system seems to weaken the exter-
nal legitimacy, resulting in possible compliance problems, as will
be illustrated later in this paper.
The next question that arises with regard to the panel process
is what outcome is most likely to occur when the panel makes its
rulings in the dispute between Airbus and Boeing regarding
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft.
3. Ruling Made by the WTO: Who, if Anyone, Will Win?
If the WTO is required to make a ruling, the question be-
comes who, if anyone, will win? Each side charges the other
with violating the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures and contends that it would prevail in a ruling
made by the WTO. However, dispute settlement at the WTO is
a very complex process, and the outcome of a case like this is
highly uncertain. 182 A tentative prediction of the outcome of a
ruling made by the WTO will follow, assessing which party to the
dispute, if any, is more likely to prevail.
a. Defining "Subsidies"
From the very start of the dispute between Airbus and Boeing,
the exact definition of "subsidies" has been controversial. If the
WTO panels make their decisions, the main issues will revolve
around the question of what constitutes a subsidy and whether
United States and EC actions are in accordance with WTO law.
In other words, the issue will be what defines a harmful or "bad"
subsidy. '1 8 3 The panels will have to deal with questions like
whether a government loan is a subsidy if it is below market-rate
and is not repayable if the aircraft program does not generate
182 Robert Wall & Douglas Barrie, Brinkmanship: Accusations Fly Across the Atlan-
tic over Aircraft Subsidies, Signaling that Common Ground Remains Elusive, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., March 28, 2005, at 24; Townsend, supra note 7.
183 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 10; Phillip L. Swagel, Com-
ments on "Boeing vs. Airbus: An Examination of the Issues," Mar. 17, 2005, available at
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.22140,filler.all/pubdetail.asp.
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profits, whether government-backed research and defense pro-
grams are subsidies, and whether government loans and grants
given to key suppliers are subsidies."8 4
b. Likeliness of a Ruling Against Airbus
One possible outcome of the present dispute is that Boeing
will prevail, and the launch aid and other measures provided to
Airbus will be declared violations of the SCM Agreement. Trade
expert Daniel Ikenson feels that Boeing has a strong case be-
cause the subsidies that the EC provides to Airbus are a "blatant
violation of free trade rules." ' 5 The United States seems to
have an advantage in this case because the direct loans provided
to Airbus appear much more vulnerable to being ruled viola-
tions of the SCM Agreement than the indirect aid Boeing re-
ceives.'8 6 Many experts think that the loans given to Airbus will
not pass the WTO test.'8 7 Moreover, analysts believe that the
Europeans' complaint about the Washington state tax credits is
weaker because trade officials in Washington were trying to at-
tractjobs to their state, and those types of subsidies are presuma-
bly not banned by the WTO.'88
The United States claims that EC support for the A380 contra-
venes both the 1992 Agreement and the SCM Agreement. I 9 Of
course, the EC asserts that its support for the A380 conforms to
both; and Airbus insists that launch aid is legal. 9 ° For the
184 Philip Butterworth-Hayes, Time to Talk About Subsidies, AEROSPACE AM., Nov.
2004, at 4, 5.
185 David Nicklaus, Boeing and Airbus Turn up the Heat in Fight over Funding, ST.
Louis TODAY, June 6, 2005, at Cl.
186 Thomas Fischermann, Wehr steckt mehr ein? Der Subventionsstreit zwischen Boe-
ing und Airbus eskaliert, DIE ZEIT, Feb. 6, 2005, available at http://www.zeit.de/
2005/23/Boeing-Kasten; No More Subsidies for Either Boeing or Airbus, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 11, 2004, at 90; The Boeing-Airbus Trade Dispute: Implications for
Transatlantic Relations and Global Trade, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, A BRIEF-
ING BY THE CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE AND THE POVERTY AND
GLOBAL INITIATIVE 1, 54 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/
center-hp.htm.
187 Boeing v Airbus: See You in Court, ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2005, available at
http://www.economist.com; Airbus's Cold Shower, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 14,
2005, http://online.wsj.com/home/us.
18 Thomas J. Downey, Airbus "Loans" Are Stealth Subsidies, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
2005, at Al; No More Subsidies for Either Boeing or Airbus, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Oct. 11, 2004, at 91.
189 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 8.
1911 Boeing Seeks to Reopen 7tlks on State Aid, GUARDIAN, June 14, 2005, available at
http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/01505647,00.html; ROYAL AERONAUTICAL
SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 8.
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United States to succeed with this claim, it will need to demon-
strate that the Europeans are extending a subsidy, American in-
terests were hurt, and there is a demonstrable connection
between the subsidy and the harm done.'9'
The United States argues that the connection between EC
loans and harm to Boeing is clearly reflected in Boeing's steady
loss of market share. For the United States to prevail on its
claims, the panel merely has to recognize a link between the
loans and Boeing's shift in market share. The Europeans deny
the connection and argue that the United States will have to
demonstrate the link precisely. 192 The fact that Boeing has lost
twenty percent of the market share in the past four years seems
to make that point quite obvious, but nothing is really apparent
in this matter. There may be factors that speak for a ruling
favorable to Boeing, but the fact that the parties are arguing
about what degree of connection is required shows that an out-
come completely in favor of Boeing is not certain.
c. Likeliness of a Ruling Against Boeing
According to David Pritchard, Airbus' strongest point may be
the $3.2 billion incentive package that the state of Washington
approved for the production of the Boeing Model 787, formally
known as the 7E7.193 Pritchard and McPherson assert that close
to fifty percent of public investments in the case of the Boeing
787 are actionable or prohibited under WTO rules.194 Moreo-
ver, reductions in the state's business and occupancy taxes con-
stitute a clear violation of the WTO rules on providing
production subsidies because this money will not be paid
back.'95 According to Teal Group aerospace analyst Richard
Aboulafia, Boeing's financial transparency is also a weakness in
19 Robert Wall, Pierre Sparaco &James Oh, Collision Course: US-European Union
1992 Aircraft Subsidy Agreement Dies as the Trade War Countdown Starts, AVIATION WK.
& SPACE TECH., Oct. 11, 2004, at 32.
192 Id.
M9. John Della Contrada, Subsidy War Could Harm Boeing More Than Airbus, UB
Researcher Says, U. BUFF. REP., June 24, 2004, available at http://www.buffalo.edu/
reporter/vo135/vo135n40/articles/Boeing.html; David Pritchard & Alan Mac-
Pherson, Industrial Subsidies and the Politics of World Trade: The Case of Boeing 7E7, 1
THE INDUS. GEOGRAPHER 57, 63 (2004).
194 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 9.
195 Pritchard & MacPherson, supra note 194, at 63; Risk Exposure: As Airbus'Suc-
cess Grows, Boeing Insists It's Time to Re-Examine Subsidies, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., July 26, 2004, at 28.
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this case.'"' Aboulafia is specifically referring to Japan's govern-
ment funding of the Boeing 7E7 program, about which the Eu-
ropean side has been complaining. 1 7 Furthermore, the EC
states that it has collected evidence that clearly demonstrates
that the massive subsidies to Boeing committed since 1992 vio-
late the SCM Agreement."'" While these points seem to indicate
a ruling in favor of Airbus, it is not assured that the panel will
find for the European side.
d. Ruling Against Both Parties
It is also possible that neither party will prevail, and, instead,
the panel could rule that both parties are in violation of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.' 9 In
fact, according to many commentators and experts, this is the
likeliest outcome of the dispute. 20 ' Boeing already has received
an adverse decision by the WTO involving the Foreign Sales
Corporations program.2 1 1 The same danger exists in this
case."" In an editorial of the Chicago Tribune, it was said that
"neither company's hands are clean" and that "[t]hey may both
lose, since the WTO is traditionally hostile to government give-
aways involving prominent exporters. '"203
Or, as was stated in the Financial Times:
The WTO panel could well rule that both the United States and
the European Union are in violation of its rules, leaving Brussels
1 6 RichardAboulafia.coin, June 2004 Letter, http://ww.richardaboulafia.
com/shawnote.asp?id= 164 (last visited June 6, 2006).
97 Raphael Minder & Mariko Sanchanta, Japan Embroiled in EU-US Trade Row,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at 6; Pierre Sparaco, Vision Takes Shape: Aerospace Giants
Boeing and Airbus on Different Paths; Grid for Battle in Unpredicted Ways, AVIATION
WK. & SPACE TECH., .july 19, 2004, at 132.
'u EU News, EU Resumes WTO Case Against Boeing (May 31, 2005), available
at http://jpn.cec.eu.int/home/news en newsobjl2l6.php (last visited Aug. 15,
2005).
1"., Townsend, supra note 7.
21)) Air War, EcoNoMilsT, June 25, 2005, at 12; Boeing, Airbus, and the WI7O, Nov.
30, 2004, http://vw.danieldrenizer.com.; see Evans, supra note 145; Jeffrey E.
Garten, Why the Airbus-Boeing Case Could Wreck the WI"O, and How to Stop It, I
ECONOMIQUII-Y9 (2005); On the Brink, WALL ST.J. ONLINE, Apr. 12, 2005, http://
online.wsj.com/home/us.
20 United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/DS/108 R
(Oct. 8, 2005).
202 Scott Hamilton, Boeing Should Be Careful What It Asks For, SEATTLE POS-IN-
rELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 2005, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/opinion/
219250_boeingO8.htnil.
20.- Editorial, The New Air War, CI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 2004, at C30.
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and Washington in the 'unhappy and mutually destructive posi-
tion of levying truly gigantic trade penalties against each other,
perhaps totaling tens of billions of dollars or euros.2 °4
During negotiations in January 2005, European trade commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson said that "[b]oth sides' subsidies would
have been struck down under a WTO verdict. '20 5 He further
stated that a "WTO verdict would probably take years and could
be unclear, with no clear-cut victory for either side. ' 20 6 Accord-
ing to political analyst Eugene Gholz, it is highly unlikely that
there will be an outcome with only one party being penalized
because such an outcome would be very difficult politically for
the WTO. 20 ' A final solution of the controversy before the WTO
seems unlikely. Observers foresee panel reports that declare
parts of the financial assistance given to Airbus as well as to Boe-
ing illegal.20 8 In the end, it is quite likely that either party could
win, and there is a significant danger that the WTO would rule
that both complaints are valid. 20 9 Due to the arguments men-
tioned above and the fact that both sides grant their respective
aircraft manufacturers significant financial assistance, the most
likely outcome in the Airbus-Boeing dispute is that both parties'
complaints will be ruled valid.
e. Who Will Suffer More?
"Airplanes are among the most valuable and highest-volume
elements of international trade, with forecasters estimating a $2
trillion export market of up to 25,000 planes over the next 20
years." 210 Consequently, the stakes in this confrontation are ex-
tremely high for both sides and both could suffer severely from
204 Airing Differences: The Airbus-Boeing Dispute Should Be Kept Out of the WTO, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 7, 2004, at 20.
205 Daniel Michaelis, William Echikson & J. Lynn Lunsford, US, EU Agree to
Aerospace Talks; Negotiations May Head Off All-Out Trade War at WTO Over Aid to
Boeing Airbus, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2005, at A2.
206 Von Reppert-Bismarck & Echikson, supra note 96, at A2.
207 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 54.
2o8 Der Streit urn Flugzeugsubventionen eskaliert, FAZ FRANKFURT (F.R.G.), June 1,
2005, at 11; Thomas Bauer, Transatlantischer Subventionsstreit Boeing-Airbus Hinter-
grund und Lcsungskonzepte, CENTRUM FOR ANGEWANDTE POLITIKFORSCHUNG (Den.),
June 3, 2005, available at http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2005/
airbus-boing.php.
209 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 9.
210 Edward Gresser, Time for Airbus to Keep Itself Aloft, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST.,




a transatlantic battle over subsidies." With the odds being that
both sides are likely to "win" their cases, the issue becomes who
will lose more, or for whom are the stakes higher?2 12
On the one hand, a WTO confrontation may be more prob-
lematic for Boeing because its 7E7 support has not yet been
paid. 21 ' However, according to Richard Aboulafia, Boeing has
"the unique track record of building planes and showing returns
to investors," which makes Boeing more equipped for autonomy
than Airbus.2 4 Nevertheless, Boeing probably would not escape
an adverse ruling from the WTO unscathed.21 5 In the end it will
be very difficult to assess who will stand "to gain or lose the most
in what at best would be a very messy outcome. "216 Conse-
quently, there will probably be a similar impact on both sides.217
4. Surveillance of the Implementation of Recommendations and
Rulings
The major criticism of the WTO dispute settlement system
concerns the provisions dealing with implementation and com-
pensation. 218 This section assesses the efficiency of the imple-
mentation stage, including compliance, remedies, and
enforcement. This phase seems to be even more challenging
and may yield even more problems than the areas of concern in
the panel procedure.
a. Implementation of a Ruling
Following the issuance of a panel or Appellate Body decision,
the DSU demands "prompt compliance" with the recommenda-
tions and rulings from member nations implicated in the dis-
pute.2 19 The panel and Appellate Body have the power, but not
the obligation, to suggest ways that the DSB should implement
the recommendations.2 2 ° Within thirty days after adoption, the
211 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 3; Schuman, supra note 98.
212 See RoYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 10.
213 Warren Giles & Andrea Rothman, Boeing, Airbus Aid May Violate Trade Rules,
EU Commission Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 4, 2004, http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=71000001&refer=&sid=abD.rpyX7+lQ (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
214 Wingfield, supra note 171.
215 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 10.
216 Id.
217 Wingfield, supra note 171.
218 Mark Clough, The WO Dispute Settlement System-A Practitioner Perspective, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 252, 270 (2000).
219 DSU, supra note 105, art. 21(1).
22(0 DSU, supra note 105, art. 19.
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losing party must inform the DSB how and when it intends to
implement the recommendations and rulings.2 ' If immediate
compliance is impracticable, the losing party may be given a rea-
sonable period of time, which should not exceed fifteen months
from the adoption of the report.
Article 4, paragraph 7 of the SCM Agreement contains a lex
specialis rule stipulating that the panel shall specify in its recom-
mendations the time period within which a prohibited subsidy
must be withdrawn.22 2 In case of actionable subsidies, the maxi-
mum period for implementing measures either to remove the
adverse affects of the subsidy or to withdraw the subsidy is six
months from the date of the adoption of the report by the
DSB.223
b. Compliance Problems
This section of the article discusses the likelihood of compli-
ance with rulings issued by the WTO. It argues that the parties
are not likely to comply with a decision made by the W'TO and
then addresses the problems that might arise in the event of
non-compliance.
According to Article 21(1) of the DSU, "prompt compliance
with recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in or-
der to ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
Members. '' 22' As indicated above, there is a high chance that
the WTO will declare both American and European subsidies
illegal. A similar dispute in the WTO between Canada and Bra-
zil over aircraft subsidies ended in a double ruling against
both.225
i. Double Ruling Against Canada and Brazil
The aircraft manufacturers Embraer and Bombardier have
been embroiled in a dispute since 1996 with a significant num-
ber of panel reports issued but no satisfactory end in sight. 226 In
221 Porges, supra note 106, at 1104.
222 Allan Rosas, Implementation and Enforcement of WTO Dispute Settlement Find-
ings: An EU Perspective, 3J. INT'L ECON. L. 131, 134 (2001).
223 Id.
224 DSU, supra note 105, art. 21(1).
225 See generally Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Appellate Body Report, Canada-Measures
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (Aug. 20, 1999).
226 Joseph D'Cruz & Charles M. Gastle, Canada-Brazil Trade Relations: An expe-
dited Arbitral Mechanism May Be Required to Resolve the WO Aircraft from Brazil/Ca-
226
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1999, the DSB adopted the Appellate Body Report finding that
Brazil was in violation of the SCM Agreement.227 One year later,
the WTO panel determined that Brazil still was not in compli-
ance with the SCM Agreement.-2 Canada was therefore
granted authority to impose "economic countermeasures"
against Brazil. 229 Instead of imposing punitive tariffs, Canada
matched what it perceived to be non-compliant subsidies. 23 0
This "matching" strategy represented a so-called "self-help" rem-
edy, which clearly ignored the comments of the Appellate Body
Report in 1999.21 1 These self-help remedies are said to threaten
the viability of the INTO dispute settlement mechanism because
it is designed to prevent such unilateral action.2
Like in the case where Brazil refused to comply with Appellate
Body findings,2 rulings made in the Airbus-Boeing dispute may
be ignored or bypassed by the parties due to the critical impor-
tance of the companies to the United States and EC.2 14 With so
many jobs at stake, it could be hard for either government to
back down. 3 5 Prestige, wealth, and power make it unlikely that
the national governments will readily comply with a ruling made
by the WTO that is not in their favor."
The panel or Appellate Body recommendations were ignored
in other cases where long-standing disputes between major
countries involved crucial interests for each side.2"7 Two cases
where suspension of concession or other obligations were re-
quested and ignored were EC-BANANAS and EC-HOR-
nada Dispute, ESTEY CENTRE FOR L. & ECON. IN INT'iL TRADE, Feb. 2002, at 1, 23,
available at http://www.esteycentre.ca/CanadaBrazilTradeRelations.pdf; Helena
D. Sullivan, Regionaljet Trade Wars: Politics and Compliance in WIO Dispute Resolu-
tion, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 71, 73 (2003).
227 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/
DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
228 D'Cruz & Gastle, supra note 226, at 24.
229 ]dt.
230 Id. at 26.
2 Id. at 9; see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme
fir Aircraft, AWT/DS46/13 (Nov. 26, 1999).
232 D'Cruz & Gastle, supra note 226, at 9.
233 Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/
DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
2,4 Winston Marshall, Transatlantic Trade Confrontation, POWER PoL. ARCHIVE,
Oct. 6, 2004, available at http://w.powerpolitics.org.
'-35 Evans, supra note 144.
236 Marshall, supra note 234.
237 Zhu Lanye, The Effects of the WFO Dispute Settlement Panel and Appellate Body
Reports: Is the Dispute Settlement Body Resolving .Specific Disputes Only or Making Prece-
dent at the Same Time?, 17 TEMP. INr'L & COMP. L.J. 221, 225 (2003).
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MONES .23  As will be shown, the EC has a worse track record
than the United States with regard to compliance with WTO
rulings.
ii. Compliance Issues Illustrated by the EC-Bananas and EC-
Hormones Cases
The EC-BANANAS dispute demonstrates the difficulty en-
countered by the WTO in ascertaining what constitutes compli-
ance and reveals the unsettled issue of the time frame within
which Member nations must comply.239 The dispute also exem-
plifies that Article 21 of the DSU basically gives a Member na-
tion the chance to use the time given to comply as a mechanism
to evade WTO obligations.24 °
The EC-BANANAS case was exceedingly complex. It resulted
in a lengthy series of decisions stretching over eight years and
presented an extremely controversial and difficult implementa-
tion problem that almost destroyed the WTO system in its rela-
tive infancy.241 The significance of the case was that the EC
repeatedly showed reluctance to correct the violations identified
in the report.2 4 2 Similarly, in the EC-HORMONES case, the Eu-
ropean side showed, from the beginning of the case, a clear re-
luctance to comply with the ruling made by the WTO. 24 3 These
WTO rulings were seen by many as the first test of whether the
EC was prepared to begin honoring agricultural dispute settle-
ment rulings under the WTO. In these particular cases against
the EC, "Europe has done nothing thus far to engender confi-
dence that it will begin to implement properly future adverse
23- Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 25, 1997); Appellate
Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
239 Erin N. Palmer, The WTO Slips Up: A Critique of the World Trade Organization's
Dispute Settlement Understanding Through the European Union Banana Dispute, 69
TENN. L. REv. 443, 473 (2002).
240 Id.
241 Douglas Ierley, Symposium Issue on the WTO Dispute Settlement Compliance: De-
fining the Factors that Influence Developing Country Compliance with and Participation in
the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the Dispute Over Bananas, 33 LAw
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 615, 636 (2002).
242 Frances Williams, Ecuador Seeks to Retaliate in Banana Dispute, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1999, at 7.
243 Carolyn B. Gleason & Pamela D. Walther, The WTO Dispute Settlement Imple-




rulings. "244 If compliance problems arose in those relatively
modest commercial disputes, "many doubt whether the system
will succeed in resolving the more challenging trade disputes"
that are currently pending at the WTOY45
The United States record of compliance with decisions made
by the WTO can be described as mixed. Of the thirteen WTO
cases against the United States that had reached the implemen-
tation stage by October 2002, the United States appears to have
complied with nine. z46 Interestingly enough, the main incidents
of non-compliance have been disputes with the EC.24 7 Although
the United States, by contrast, has more consistently come into
compliance with adverse WTO rulings, there are quite a few
cases pending at the WTO that have the potential of raising dif-
ficult compliance issues in the near future. 248  The United
States, for instance, is having considerable implementation
problems in the Foreign Sales Corporations case, which has
been going on for years and still is not satisfactorily resolved.249
"This case involves a high degree of risk for the world trading
system," and "[t]he scale of retaliation threatened . . , and its
long running nature makes this an important test" for the
WTO.25 0
In particular, the Foreign Sales Corporations case, the EC-BA-
NANAS dispute, and the EC-HORMONES dispute show that the
parties are aware of the difficulties that can arise when "high
profile" cases are decided by a WTO ruling. 25' One could infer
that the parties to this dispute believe and hope that the other
side will eventually comply with the WTO ruling, as finally hap-
pened in the EC-BANANAS case. One could also conclude that
the United States and the EC know how difficult it is to imple-
244 Id. at 728.
245 Id.
246 Naboth Van den Broek, Power Paradoxes in Enforcement and Implementation of
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Reports: Interdisciplinary Approaches and
New Proposals, 37J. WORLD TRADE 127, 140 (2003).
247 Panel Report, United States-Tax Treatment of Foreign Sales Corporations, WT/
DS 108/R (Oct. 8, 1999); Panel Report, United States-Anti Dumping Act of 1916,
WT/DS 136/8/AB/R, WT/DS 162/l1/AB/R (Oct. 2, 2000).
248 Gleason & Walther, supra note 244, at 729; Swagel, supra note 184.
249 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
United States-Tax Treatment of "Foreign Sales Corporations", WT/DS108/29 (Jan. 14,
2005); William J. Davey, The WFO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 27 (2004).
250 Chris Nixon, WFO Dispute Settlement Procedure Implications for a Small County,
1, 13 (NZTC, Working Paper No. 22, 2002), available at http://www.nzier.org.nz.
2_I Id. at 10-14.
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ment the recommendations made by the WTO ruling when the
industry concerned is of high importance to the parties in-
volved. The EC-HORMONES case is such a case and is still not
fully resolved.252
Many trade experts believe that a WTO decision in the Boe-
ing-Airbus dispute, possibly banning some types of subsidies but
allowing others, could be so confusing that it would be difficult
for either the United States or Europe to implement. 25 3 With
the stakes in the Boeing-Airbus case exceptionally high and the
airplane manufacturing industry a crucial factor in the respec-
tive countries' economies, it seems rather doubtful that the par-
ties will comply with a decision promptly.254 Conversely, the
high stakes nature of this dispute almost guarantees that one or
both economic powers will not comply with the WTO rulings.255
iii. The "Buying-Out" Option
The EC-BANANAS dispute also highlights the fact that Mem-
ber nations may choose the imposition of sanctions over the en-
forcement of WTO recommendations or rulings.256 The EC
voluntarily failed to fully comply with WTO recommendations
and rulings, resulting in the WTO authorizing retaliation
against the EC banana import regime.257 The European side
chose the imposition of $191.4 million in sanctions in 1999 over
full compliance with the WTO ruling.25 1 Whereas the EC imme-
diately refused to comply in the dispute over the import of ba-
nanas, in the Foreign Sales Corporations case the United States
has at least taken steps to pass legislation to comply with the
ruling issued by the WTO. 2 5 9
Choosing to pay rather than fully comply, especially with re-
gard to the European side, is likely to happen in the Airbus-
Boeing dispute due to the vital importance of aircraft manufac-
252 WTO News Item, WTO Dispute Body Establishes Panels on US and Canada
Sanctions in 'Hormones' Dispute (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.wto.
org/english/newse/news05_e/dsb 17feb05_e.htm.
253 Miller, supra note 59, at Al.
254 Daniel W. Drezner, When Bilateral Is Better Than Multilateral, Jan. 11, 2005,
http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives.001822.html.
255 Id.
256 Palmer, supra note 239, at 473.
257 Id. at 482.
258 Id.
259 Request for Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United




turing to the United States and EC. Goldstein and McGuire sug-
gest that both governments may conclude that the costs of
compliance are too high if it means reversing several decades of
industrial and technological policy favoring an export-orien-
tated aerospace sector."" Much will depend upon shifting as-
sessments of the costs of compliance versus the costs of non-
compliance.26 '
The acceptance of sanctions rather than compliance with
W'A-TO recommendations and rulings seriously undermines the
effectiveness of the DSU and the whole WTO system. "2 The
reality that a member nation may elect the imposition of trade
sanctions rather than compliance reflects a substantial weakness
in the DSU.2" If powerful nations continue to choose sanctions
over compliance, non-compliance may become an acceptable
option and the WTO would serve little purpose in the area of
dispute resolution.4 It is not possible to build a credible system
of global governance if compliance can simply be replaced with
compensation.2"5 Or, as former United States Trade Represen-
tative Charlene Barshefsky noted, "[w]e cannot have a global,
rules-based system if major partners in it do not comply. 2'6
c. No Suitable Remedies
Even if the losing party is willing to comply with a ruling, suit-
able remedies must be found. Many WTO Members consider
the issue of remedies a major problem in WTO law.2"7 This is-
sue is pertinent in the Airbus-Boeing dispute because no clear
and suitable remedy seems available for the parties involved.
260 A.E. Goldstein & S.M. McGuire, The World Economy, FIN. TImEs, Oct. 7, 2004,
at 7.
261 RoYAL AERONAUTICHAL SOCIET'Y, supra note 18, at 9.
262 Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade Or
ganization: The Inability of the 14l'O Dis)yute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 138 (2001).
263 Id. at 163.
264 Id.
265 Marco C.E.J. Bronckers, Mare Power to the WI''O?, 4J. INT'L ECON. L. 41, 50
(2001).
2-6 EU Unsure How to Comply with the New 147T0 Decisions on Bananas, INSIDE U. S.
TRADE, Apr. 16, 1999, at 21.
267 See generally Robert E. Hudec, Broadening the Scope of Remedies in 14W7l Dispute
Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DisPuiE SEIr-FLEMENT PROCEDURES 369, 399 (Friedl
Weiss ed., 2000).
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Trade retaliation and compensation are the classic remedies
of the WTO.2 68 Retaliation and compensation "aim to exercise
pressure on the non-complying country to bring its measures
into conformity with W'TO law. '' 269 These measures are "only
possible when the non-complying country offers it and the par-
ties to the dispute agree on its scope and implementation. '"270
"Although the DSU expresses an affirmative preference for
compliance with DSU rulings and recommendations, it also de-
lineates procedures for compensation or the suspension of con-
cession or other obligations. ' 271 If a WTO Member fails to
implement recommendations and rulings adopted by the DSB
within the required period of time, the complaining party is en-
titled to request authorization from the DSB to suspend conces-
sions and other obligations such as applying trade sanctions.272
Within that context, trade sanctions should be linked as closely
as possible to the subject matter of the panel proceedings to
which they relate. Only if the complaining party believes that it
is not practicable to seek suspension of concessions within the
same sector in which a violation had been found, may that party
seek to apply trade sanctions in other sectors under the same
agreement. 273
"Compensation" in the WTO system has a very different
meaning than in international law generally. While "compensa-
tion" is ordinarily thought of as a retrospective remedy designed
to compensate for past harm, in the WTO, the term refers to a
purely forward-looking remedy: the granting of a trade benefit
to the prevailing party in order to compensate prospectively for
the nullification or impairment caused by a non-conforming
measure. 274  Consequently, the term "compensation" in the
WTO context traditionally does not refer to payment for trade
lost because of an inconsistent measure, but rather to a
rebalancing of trade concessions. 27 Only on very rare occasions
268 Merco Bronckers & Naboth Van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the
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will retaliation be considered appropriate for past harms, such
as in the case of the United States regarding the Anti Dumping
Act of 1916.76
Simply leveling the field, as in compensation under the WTO,
runs the risk that the violator is better off having broken the
rules than complying with them since no damages for the past
can be claimed under current DSU rules. No further incentive
is provided in the WTO rules to remove this inconsistency apart
from compensation; this prospective remedy effectively gives a
premium to non-complying countries that drag their feet in im-
plementing a WTO ruling, as they do not have to worry about
the past.277
This shortcoming also affects the Airbus-Boeing dispdte be-
cause even after the United States had requested consultations
at the WTO and terminated the 1992 Civil Aircraft Agreement,
the British government received an aid request in April 2005
from Airbus for launch aid of the A350, which is also supported
by the EC. 78 European Trade Commissioner Mandelson even
stated that throughout proceedings and a very likely appeal by
the losing party, "nothing would prevent either side from con-
tinuing to offer further financial support. ' 279 If Airbus gets the
launch aid for the A350 while the litigation is under way, assis-
tant professor Eugene Gholz believes that "there won't be an
easy remedy even if the United States does win this trade
case."280
If the WTO finds that the European or United States govern-
ment is improperly subsidizing the manufacturers, the govern-
ments will each be told to stop breaking the rules. If they fail to
desist, retaliatory sanctions will be allowed in line with a scale set
by the WTO.28 ' The level of authorized suspended concessions
"shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impair-
276 Decision by the Arbitrators, United States-Anti Dumping Act of 1916, WATF/
DS/136 ARB (Feb. 24, 2004); see Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at
102.
277 Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 103.
271 Airbus Requests U.K. Aid to Help Launch A350Jet, WALL ST.J. ONLINE, May 19,
2005, http://online.wsj.com/home/us.
279 Robert Wall & David Bond, Anybody Listening?; As "Deadline" Nears, U.S. and
Europe Continue to Press Their Cases in Aircraft Subsidy Debate, 162 AVIATiON WK. &
SPACE TECH. 37 (2005).
280 Rebecca Christie, More Talk, Ongoing Spats Seen in US-EU Aircraft Trade War,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 6, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/home/us; TilE BROOK-
INGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 44.
281 Evans, supra note 144.
2006]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ment.' '28 2 The major problem in that context is the calculation
of the level of nullification and impairment. A senior United
States trade official stated that the United States, "if it prevails,
would ask the WTO to require that Airbus repay the launch aid
on commercial terms. '2 3 The United States could put tariffs on
European goods if the WTO rules against Airbus, and vice versa.
These tariffs could cause major turbulence throughout the avia-
tion industry and even beyond.284
The problem is that "retaliation puts a disproportionate bur-
den on innocent bystanders. Industries who are not at all in-
volved in the particular trade dispute will suffer from trade
retaliation. ' 285 Assistant Professor Gholz said that if the United
States were awarded sanctions, the Americans might protect
even some other threatened industry rather than target the air-
line market.2 6 For instance, in both EC-Bananas and EC-Hor-
mones, the level of sanctions bore no accurate relationship to
the breach of WTO commitments. Or, as one author has stated,
"the punishment does not fit the crime. 287 Only in rare cares
will it be possible to get the level of sanctions right. Other pen-
alties, like paying back subsidized loans early, seem equally inef-
fective. With regard to the Airbus-Boeing dispute, Gholz said
that "the remedies people are talking about are not actually de-
sirable remedies. 288
d. Difficulties of Enforcing a Ruling
Strongly connected to the question of compliance and reme-
dies is the question of enforcement and what can be done if the
parties are not willing to comply with a ruling rendered by the
WTO. The major problem is that the WTO does not have a real
282 DSU, supra note 105, art. 22.4.
283 Elizabeth Price & Rebecca Christie, USTR Says Confident WFO Can Resolve
Boeing-Airbus Fight, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 31, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
home/us.
284 See Airbus-Boeing Culture War, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Oct. 21, 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/1021/p08s01-comv.htm; Evans, supra
note 144.
285 Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 103.
286 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 44; Christie, supra note 280.
287 Bernard O'Connor, Remedies in the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement
System, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 245, 263 (2004).
288 See Christie, supra note 280; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at
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enforcement arm. 2 " The "legalization" of the dispute settle-
ment process has not been paired with a stronger enforcement
mechanism.2 "" This creates a major impediment to the WTO's
enforcement of its rulings.
The WTO does not seek to enforce directly compliance itself.
It employs softer methods, such as monitoring and reporting on
implementation and discussions in councils and ministerial
meetings, to encourage Members to conform. 21 ' The purpose
of remedies in current WTO law is not to punish the WTO
Member that is the subject of the complaint, but to achieve a
prompt settlement when all prior procedures have been ex-
hausted. 21 2 "Experience with the implementation of retaliation
suggests that it adds little, if anything, to the pressure applied to
bring the [violation] in question into compliance." ":¢ Even if
the WTO were to make a clear ruling against one or both sides,
"it would be impossible to enforce in view of the huge commer-
cial and political interests at stake on both sides of the
Atlantic. "294
C. Is THE WTO THE PROPER FORUM FOR THE DisPuTE?
Closely linked to the question of whether the WTO is
equipped to handle this case is another very controversial issue:
whether the WTO is even the appropriate forum to settle this
dispute. The next section of this paper will contrast the two op-
posing views to this highly controversial question. z While
some experts2 96 argue that the WTO has been set up to handle
disputes just like this, even when they are large and highly com-
2 9 Richard Aboulafia, Boeing's WIO Complaint: The Last Battle?, AE ROSPACE Am.,
Jan. 2005, at 11; Feeney, supra note 117, at 108.
290 Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the VIO: Rules Are
Rules-Towards a More Collective Approach, 94 ANI. J. INT'i L. 335, 338 (2000).
2'91 Aurup, supra note 102, at 902.
2 2 O'Connor, supra note 287, at 264.
293 D'Cruz & Gastle, supra note 226, at 70.
294 Edward Alden & Raphael Minder, War of Aircraft Titans Gives WJO Biggest
Case, FIN. TIMES, June 1, 2005, at 8.
21,5 Townsend, supra note 7.
296 Marc L. Busch, Testimony of Marc L Busch To the House Aviation Subcommittee,
May 25, 2005, http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/05-25-05/busch.
pdf; Senator Patty Murray, Aerospace: Murray Statement on the Filing of Competing
Aerospace Cases at the World Trade Organization, May 31, 2005, http://mirray.sen-
ate.gov/news.
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plex, the majority of experts have the opinion that the WTO is
not the appropriate forum for this dispute.297
1. Arguments for the WFO Being the Proper Forum to Settle this
Dispute
There are basically four arguments as to why the WTO is the
proper forum to settle this dispute.
a. Effective Mechanism
Since it is only possible to block rulings at the WTO by con-
sensus after the Uruguay Round, "there is a sense that litigation
may be more efficacious this time around."29 According to
United States trade representatives and other government offi-
cials, the WTO is equipped and exactly the place to litigate this
dispute.299 They believe that "the WTO was created to channel
disputes into a neutral forum" where global rules are applied.3 °°
According to these notions, the WTO dispute settlement system
is an effective mechanism, and the WTO is the right place to
settle this dispute even though it might be very complex and not
easy to resolve.'
b. Clear Up the Situation
Moreover, the WTO could "bring needed transparency to
what constitutes an unacceptable subsidy. '30 2 The Airbus-Boe-
ing litigation could help clarify "which subsidy programs are ille-
gal under international trade rules, and which are not. '30 3
c. Creating a Precedent
By deciding this case, the WTO could also create a precedent.
The experience of Canada and Brazil at the WTO is instructive,
297 Airing Differences: The Airbus-Boeing Dispute Should Be Kept Out of the WTO,
GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 9, 2004, at 27; Miller, supra note 59, at A2; Swagel,
supra note 183; Marshall, supra note 235.
298 Busch, supra note 296.
299 Elizabeth Price & Rebecca Christie, USTR Says Confident WTO Can Resolve
Boeing-Airbus Fight, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 31, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
home/us; Senator Patty Murray, supra note 296.
300 Boeing-Airbus Row Goes into the "Deep Freeze" FIN. TIMES (London), June 7,
2005, at 15.
301 Gresser, supra note 210; Senator Patty Murray Statement, supra note 296.
302 Airbus-Boeing Culture War, supra note 284.
303 Busch, supra note 296; Richard Morrisson, Battle of the Airliner Welfare
Queens, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., July 14, 2005, available at http://www.cei.org.
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and the WTO ruling made in that case has curtailed the use of
certain subsidy programs. The Airbus-Boeing litigation at the
WTO could impact not only the United States and Europe, but
also other countries such as Brazil and Canada as well, "in the
sense that WTO rulings influence how subsequent cases are
decided.'"1
4
d. Force the Parties to an Agreement
The WTO rulings in the Canada and Brazil case has "pres-
sured both sides to return to the bargaining table" to renegoti-
ate and try to "seek a long-term solution" to their problem." 5
According to some commentators, the "result of the litigation"
at the WTO "will likely encourage the United States and Europe
to return to the negotiating table."3 " The benefit of the WTO is
that it can depoliticize highly political and controversial cases-
"and perhaps force the two sides to an agreement to avoid high
WTO-sanctioned tariffs. '3 7  Or, as WATO lawyer Brendan
McGivern said, "A/TO obligations could focus the bilateral nego-
tiations in a way that may not be possible at the moment."30
2. Arguments for the WTO Being an Inadequate Forum for this
Dispute
According to many analysts, the WATO is not the appropriate
forum for this dispute because the WATO seems poorly suited
and ill-equipped to resolve this case. °
a. Highly Political
Some commentators claim that the United States filed the
lawsuit more for political than economic reasons and further al-
lege that given the political nature of the decisions involved,
"the WTO seems poorly suited to resolve this case."310 The
VTO lacks the popular backing to resolve political disputes."'
Problematic in that sense is that the request for consultations by
1114 Busch, supra note 296.
30,5 Id.
3- Id.
307 Airbus-Boeing Culture War, supra note 284.
'18 Edward Alden et. al., Dogfight at the WFO, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 8,
2004, at 17.
3jo9 Claude E. Barfield, Aim for Airbus and Boeing Should Be to Operate Without
Subsidies, Oct. 13, 2005, available at http://www.aei.org; Swagel, supra note 184.
310 Swagel, supra note 183.
311 Id.
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the United States was filed just one month before the presiden-
tial election, and the employees of Boeing and manufacturers in
general are a key constituency in many states. 12 Hence, EC rep-
resentatives have questioned whether the United States action
was largely driven by political reasons. 13
b. Too Complex
Commentators argue that this dispute should not have been
brought to the WTO because it is too complex." 4 Some trade
experts state that the "WTO is utterly unsuited to deal with a
dispute on this scale, both because of the complexity of some of
the issues and the huge commercial stakes on either side.3 15
They argue that the "Trade Organization is not equipped to
handle such a large dispute between its leading powers." '316
c. Poor Record in Resolving High Stakes Disputes
For many observers, the true measure of a dispute settlement
mechanism is how it handles the "toughest cases." "Tough" or
"high-stakes" cases are those with the highest monetary and po-
litical stakes. 317 There have been several disputes over non-com-
pliance that have tested the WTO system of remedies,"'
including the EC-Bananas case, the EC-Hormones case, and the
Brazil and Canada case over aircraft subsidies.
The DSU has, according to some observers, a poor track re-
cord in resolving high stakes cases between the United States
and the EC.31 1 In particular, issues that have an "all-or-nothing-
quality" are more likely to escalate to the panel phase. 2 ° In the
"new" WTO era, defendants fully concede to complainant's de-
mands in a small minorityof cases; furthermore, these conces-
312 Gresser, supra note 210.
313 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 6.
314 Uchenna Izundu, The Battle over Aircraft Subsidies, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005,
available at WLNR 9796690.
315 Edward Alden & Ralph Minder, Airbus and Boeing Test EU-US Relations: It Is
Far from Being Clear Who Will Blink First in an Escalating Transatlantic Trade Dispute,
FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2004, at 13.
316 Jeffrey E. Garten, The Big Blowout, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Apr. 4, 2005, available at
http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/2948.html.
317 Marc Busch & Eric R. Reinhardt, Transatlantic Trade Disputes: The EU, the US
and the WJ'O, in TRANSATLANTIC TRADE CONFLICTS & GATT/WTO DISPUTE SET-
TLEMENr 475 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2003).
318 O'Connor, supra note 287, at 245.
319 Busch & Reinhardt, supra note 317, at 483.
320 Guzman & Simmons, supra note 166, at 217.
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sions are largely driven by factors outside the dispute settlement
system.12' This trend suggests that in "tough" cases, it is highly
unlikely that the parties will make concessions or that a dispute
will be settled at an early stage. European Trade Commissioner
Peter Mandelson stated that it could take "years to resolve the
standoff but it would likely result in a legal stalemate. 3 22
d. Key Document Is Missing
There is no agreement or document that precisely deals with
the subsidies and relevant issues concerned. "The 1979 Agree-
ment included the 1979 Understanding as its basis for dispute
settlement,"23 and "Appendix 1 of the 1992 Agreement states
that it is covered by the DSU. '' :1 24 However, the DSU "is not
listed in the Appendix of the DSU as an agreement that uses its
own dispute settlement terms in place of the DSU. 3 25
Furthermore, "there is corresponding uncertainty over the le-
gal mechanisms and even [the] legal status of dispute resolution
under the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft. 3 26 Efforts to
reform the agreements have failed. The 1979 Agreement was
not updated during the Uruguay Round of negotiations and was
never renegotiated; consequently, it does not reference the 1994
SCM Agreement.3 27 As a result, there are only "broad subsidy
rules that were never really intended for aircraft manufactur-
ers.'328 This means that panels will be applying subsidy rules to
aircraft makers that were not meant for the industry."' Thus,
the "key" document in this case on which the IO could rely to
make its rulings is missing.
e. Negative Effect on Other Trade Relations
An aerospace fight not only severely tests the WTO dispute-
resolution process, but also risks poisoning other trade areas,
'12l Busch & Rheinhardt, supra note 317, at 483.
322 Bradley S. Kiapper, WFO Creates Panels to Investigate EU, US Airplane Subsidies,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, July 21, 2005, http://w.online.wsj.coin/article-print/
0. .SB112185155178990650,00.htnl.
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329 Id.
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including the Doha Round.A30 A decision made by the WTO in
this case would likely cool transatlantic relations and create new
animosities regarding trade between the EC and the United
States.33 1 The decision could affect billions of dollars in future
subsidies, thousands of jobs in both countries, and could also
have effects on suppliers for both firms and subcontractors
worldwide.332 Such a decision would not only be costly and bad
for the business of Airbus and Boeing, but it could also upset
airline customers and possibly "disrupt the entire aviation
industry. 3
Moreover, production subsidies of Boeing and Airbus prod-
ucts are not limited to the United States and Europe. As indi-
cated above, the Japanese government is currently supporting
the development of Boeing planes; therefore, Japan could also
be affected by this dispute. 3 4 An escalation of the dispute could
set the tone for the resolution of similar disputes and "competi-
tion in other industries as well. '3 35 European Trade Commis-
sioner Peter Mandelson warned that the dispute "may also harm
important global talks aimed at reducing barriers to trade. 336
In the end, "the threat of countervailing import duties being
applied to new Airbus and Boeing planes would cast a pall over
the aviation industry. 33
7
f. Risk of a Trade War
If matters escalate further, there is even the threat of a trade
war between the United States and the EC.338 The above men-
tioned WTO case of Canada and Brazil is a striking example of
what can happen when the WTO issues rulings against both par-
ties who refuse to comply and "each threaten billions of dollars
330 Schuman, supra note 98.
331 On the Brink, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 12, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/
home/us.
332 See generally Miller, supra note 59, at Al.
333 Aircraft Subsidies: Enough is Enough, ECONOMIST, July 24, 2004, at 49; Robert
Wall & David Bond, Anybody Listening? As "Deadline" Nears, U.S. and Europe Con-
tinue to Press Their Cases in Aircraft Subsidy Debate, 162 AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.
37 (2005).
334 Airbus and Boeing: America Flies to War, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 2004, at 83;
Raphael Minder & Mariko Sanchanta, Japan Embroiled in EU-US Trade Row, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 8, 2004, at 6.
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336 Paul Meller, In Airbus, WIO to Get Biggest Feud, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 1,
2005, available at http://www.iht.com.




in trade sanctions as a consequence." '' In that case, neither
side was willing to back down, and the clash between the coun-
tries escalated so far that the Brazilian President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso stated, "[i]f they [Canada] want war, war is
war." "4 Neither Boeing nor Airbus has the standing of Embraer
or Bombardier, so a fierce trade war as was seen between Ca-
nada and Brazil is not likely. However, there is a risk that the
Airbus-Boeing dispute could further strain the transatlantic rela-
tionship at a crucial point in time, degenerating into a surrogate
for wider differences between the world's two biggest trading
partners and, at the worst, igniting a trade war between the
United States and Europe.
g. Likeliness of Damage to the Credibility of the WTO
"The frequent use by the United States and the EC of the
WTO dispute settlement against each other has raised 'serious
concerns about whether' those disputes are 'detrimental to the
WTO as a whole." 4 1 "Given the predicted outcome of the dis-
pute - that is, the United States and the EU going their own
ways - the WTO's credibility will suffer and affect its stature as an
impartial body. '34 2 Or, to put it in other words, the WTO could
overstrain itself with this complex case. 4 ' Additionally, the
WTO's energies could be more profitably expended
elsewhere. 44
The problem is that the WTO presently lacks the guaranteed
credibility and power it needs to function as an authoritative fi-
nal arbiter on grand international trade schemes. This credibil-
ity was "slowly being built up, and set to be fully tested by a
contentious series of cases against agricultural subsidies. '34 ' A
deal is still to be negotiated in this area, but the Airbus-Boeing
case now threatens to poison the transatlantic relationship even
more and makes a solution to the problem of subsidies in the
agricultural sector even more difficult.3 41
339 Alden et. al., supra note 308, at 17.
3-40 D'Cruz & Gastle, supra note 226, at 5.
341 Davey, supra note 249, at 32.
342 Heide B. Malhotra, Winners or Losers in the Aircraft Subsidy Battle, EPOCH
TIMES, May 25, 2005, available at http://www.theepochtimes.com/admin/make
Article2.asp?id=29236&catid=86&subcatid=0.
343 Der Streit um Flugzeugsubventionen eskaliert, FAZ FRANKFURT (F.R.G.), June 1,
2005, at 11.
344 Airing Differences, supra note 204, at 27.
345 Marshall, supra note 234.
346 1d.
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If the issue of subsidies in the agricultural sector had been
resolved before the WTO became involved in the Airbus-Boeing
dispute, the gained confidence in the WTO system could have
helped the transatlantic partners resolve their long standing bat-
tde over subsidies in the aircraft manufacturing sector.347 Now,
however, the high visibility and sensitivity of this high profile
case will propel it to the spot of central importance, making it
the "toughest" case for the WTO so far.
The greatest risk of this dispute will be the WTO's legitimacy
as a final arbiter in trade relations. The WTO currently lacks
sufficient legitimacy. 4 8 By deciding this case, the WTO "risks
losing credibility as a forum for resolving large-scale trade dis-
agreements involving powerful vested interests.''-49 As a result of
non-compliance and other problems arising out of a WT deci-
sion made in this complex dispute, other nations may lose faith
in the WTO.3 50 As a consequence, ongoing or upcoming trade
disputes may not be adequately resolved through the WTO
mechanism and could drag on for years. This dispute could also
set-back international commerce by delaying the facilitation of
global commerce and world stability.35 1
h. Not Solving the Problem and No Final Solution
Even if the WTO makes a decision and the parties comply,
this would not ultimately solve the Airbus-Boeing dispute.3 52
The WTO looks backward and assesses what happened in the
past to determine whether a party should have to pay penal-
ties . 53 The 1979 Agreement has not proven to be very success-
ful and does "not appear to deal effectively with massive
government subsidies;" accordingly, the Agreement needs to be
renegotiated.3 54 The 1992 Agreement has also outlived its use-
fulness and needs to be replaced. The questions that must be
addressed, regardless of a WTO decision, is how subsidies can be
disciplined in the future and how governments can agree to
where the limits are. This can only happen through negotia-
tions. The importance of a WTO decision would be to clarify
347 See Fisher, supra note 10, at 81.
348 Id.
349 Marshall, supra note 234.
350 See THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 39.
351 Marshall, supra note 234.
352 Christie, supra note 280; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 37.
353 THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 186, at 11.
-54 Falken, supra note 327.
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and decide which subsidies are allowed and which are not. If
only one party is in violation of the WTO rules, the prevailing
side could, with the help of the WTO, pressure the other side
into complying with the ruling.
However, if both parties are found in violation of the SCM
Agreement, both sides would have to make numerous changes
to their business cultures that are largely based on present subsi-
dies. If both are found guilty of using illegal subsidies and one
party does not fulfill its obligation under the WTO ruling, it
might be easier for the other party to take unilateral action with-
out turning to the WTO and continue using subsidies on their
own side, as illustrated by the Canada-Brazil case. According to
Hugo Paemen, former EC ambassador to Washington, a WTO
decision will not solve the problem of future disagreements.155
To have a solution that works over a long period of time, the
parties need to negotiate more workable rules for the future.
Only "bilateral talks permit the kind of give-and-take bargaining
that a WTO panel cannot provide." ' 6
3. Summary
As has been shown, throughout nearly every stage of the
panel procedure, there exist many potential problems that will
be difficult to overcome in the Airbus-Boeing dispute. Finding
the proper panelists is the first major obstacle, followed by nu-
merous difficulties concerning the panel process itself, in partic-
ular the compliance dilemma and enforceability of the panel
reports. Taking this and the above mentioned arguments into
account, especially the potential damage to WTO credentiality,
it becomes evident that the WTO is, at least at the moment, not
the appropriate forum to settle this dispute. Deciding this case
would weaken the WTO's credibility by suggesting that it is not
equipped to solve this tough and complex case. If the parties do
not settle this dispute and the WTO has to make a decision, the
result must be a firm decision. The rulings must be based on
the law and facts and not on perceived risks of sour relations or
the threat of a trade war.
VI. HOW TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE
After assessing whether the WTO is equipped to handle this
dispute and showing that it is not the proper forum for it to be
355 Christie, supra note 279.
S56 Drezner, supra note 254.
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resolved, this article addresses other ways this dispute might be
resolved. This is done by suggesting improvements to the dis-
pute settlement system that will enable it to handle "high-stakes"
cases more adequately in the future.
A. IMPROVING THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
Much has been said regarding the improvement of the WTO
system. This section focuses on how the dispute settlement
mechanism can be improved and made more ready to deal suc-
cessfully with "high-profile" cases.
1. Proposed Changes to the WTO Rules
There have been many proposals to reform the WTO dispute
settlement procedure during the last few years, especially con-
cerning the implementation stage and the enforcement mecha-
nism.357 Also, a wide range of proposals for improving and
strengthening remedies have been brought forward.35 s Exam-
ples of such solutions include collective retaliation, retroactive
damages,35 9 and monetary damages. 60
2. Specific Changes Needed for "High-Profile" Cases
This paper suggests four specific changes that could help im-
prove the WTO's dispute settlement system and facilitate the
"dealing" and decision-making in future "high-profile" cases.
a. Permanent Panel
As has been discussed, the selection process of panelists is
often extremely contentious and one of the major causes of de-
lay in the dispute settlement system because it has become in-
creasingly difficult for partners to agree on panelists.36' One
way to improve the effectiveness of the dispute settlement sys-
tem would be to introduce a permanent panel system. 6 2 This
357 Van den Broek, supra note 246, at 127.
358 Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 106.
359 Pauwelyn, supra note 290, at 335-347.
360 Bronckers, supra note 265, at 63.
361 E. Kessie, WFO Jurisprudence and Dispute Settlement Practice, in THE WTO Dis-
PUmE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 140 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2004).
362 James Cameron & Stephen J. Orava, GA7Y/WfO Panels Between Recording
and Finding Facts: Issues of Due Process, Evidence, Burden of Proof and Standard of
Review in GA7YT/W-O Dispute Settlement, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURES 195, 225 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000); Claus Dieter Ehlermann, Reflec-
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potential solution has often been suggested and was first pro-
posed by the EC in 1998."' By having all Members accept the
panelists at the outset, the parties would be precluded from op-
posing panelists, which has become increasingly problematic
within the dispute settlement process. Advantages of a perma-
nent panel include more experienced, full-time panelists that
are much more likely to be focused and, consequently, whose
reports are more likely well-reasoned, coherent, and consistent.
As a result, the Appellate Body is less likely to overlook panel
reports, which would lead to enhanced legitimacy, greater credi-
bility, and independence of the dispute settlement system.7 4
The disadvantage of a permanent panel is that parties to a
dispute are not able to choose experts specialized in the con-
cerned matter. However, if the number of rejected panelists
continues to increase, a fixed panel system might become una-
voidable. Additionally, the list from which panelists can be
drawn could be extended to contain more experts that are profi-
cient in various aspects of WTO law and other technical mat-
ters.3 65 Although this proposed change might be very difficult
and delicate to put into practice, it needs to be addressed by all
WTO Members if the overall consistency and quality of panel
reports is to be improved. At this point, anything that can be
done to improve the "professionalism" of the panel system
would be a major step forward.166
b. Improved Compliance and Enforcement Mechanism
A significant number of WTO members seem to agree that
the implementation phase of the dispute settlement system is
relatively weak as compared to other stages.367 The ability of
tions on the Process of Clarification and Improvements of the DSU, in THE WTO DispuT E
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 106, 110 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann eds., 2004); D.P. Steger, Improvements and Reforms of the WTO Appellate
Body, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 48 (Federico Ortino &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004).
363 Discussion Paper from the European Communities, Review of the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, Oct. 21, 1998, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/
respectrules/dispute/improving/0212dstl.htm.
364 Thomas Cottier, Proposals for Moving from Ad Hoc Panels to Permanent WO
Panelists, in THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 1995-2003 31, 33 (Federico
Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2004).
365 THE FEDERAL TRUST, ENHANCING WTO DISPUTE SETLEMENT, http://www.
fedtrust.co.uk (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
366 Steger, supra note 362, at 48.
367 Kessie, supra note 361, at 142.
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WTO members to prolong the implementation period and the
problem that compensation is purely for past violations creates
quite a few problems, as has been illustrated above. "Improved
incentives are needed under the DSU to help achieve the
WTO's implementation objective of 'prompt compliance."' 368
Allowing compensation at an earlier stage and, most impor-
tantly, for damages that have occurred in the past, would pro-
vide a motivation for parties in violation of WTO rules to
implement a ruling more rapidly. 6
Before introducing new remedies such as financial compensa-
tion into the WTO system, the issue that must be addressed is
whether the WTO is ready to move away from a rebalancing ap-
proach to one of "punishment" and, if so, what sort of new rem-
edies would be appropriate. 7 ° New remedies would have to be
introduced carefully and a simple approach of "punishment" in
the form of punitive damages does not fit in the system of the
WTO."' Nevertheless, one option worth considering is the pos-
sibility of introducing financial compensation as a remedy, an
option that will be addressed further in the next section.
c. Financial Compensation for Past Harms
The idea of financial compensation is not novel. Reparation
by governments for violations of laws "is part of the tradition of
public international law" and "has also been proposed more re-
cently in the WTO. '37 2 Major advantages of financial compensa-
tion are that it is not trade restrictive and does not lead to a
disproportionate burden on innocent bystanders. While sus-
pension of concessions implies an increase in trade barriers,
compensation would lower trade barriers, which is the very ob-
jective of the WTO. 373 Moreover, financial compensation helps
to redress the injury and, if introduced retroactively, is an incen-
tive to comply with WTO decisions faster.3"' This has the fur-
ther advantage of relieving pressure on the system caused by
long-term non-compliance. As has been shown, this is particu-
larly a problem in the Airbus-Boeing dispute because even after
consultations were requested, the EC applied for more aid. By
368 Gleason & Walther, supra note 243, at 712.
369 Clough, supra note 218, at 273.
370 O'Connor, supra note 287, at 266.
37, Hudec, supra note 267, at 392; see generally Sullivan, supra note 226, at 74.
372 Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 109-10.
373 Kessie, supra note 361, at 148; Rosas, supra note 22, at 137.
374 Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 110.
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introducing retroactive financial compensation parties would be
forced to comply with WTO agreements from the beginning of
proceedings. One possible solution is to calculate compensa-
tion from the date of the establishment of a panel. 7
A critical question is whether compensation should be made
mandatory.37" Problematic in that sense is that "financial com-
pensation is a 'self-help-remedy'" and a "W'TO Member depends
on the cooperation of the non-complying country to collect the
compensation. 17 7 Self-help remedies against treaty violations
are exceptional in international law,"17' and one has to keep in
mind that the WTO remains an intergovernmental system and,
as such, lacks the power to enforce and implement its rules.3 7
In addition, compensation does not lead to the same level of
political pressure on governments that suspension of concession
does because it does not impact specific industries.8 "
More than other disputes, the EC-Bananas and the Foreign
Sales Corporations cases have exposed the limits of the WTO's
system of remedies and show that something needs to be done
in this area. The remedy of financial compensation is not com-
pletely unusual in the area of international law and can, for ex-
ample, be found in the free trade agreement recently
negotiated by the United States and Morocco.' 8 One option
would be to let the winning WTO member decide whether the
classic remedies or financial compensation will achieve the best
results in terms of compliance."' Most of the Members, how-
ever, would like to retain the flexibility in deciding whether to
offer compensation.:
Another option would be to introduce such clauses in a new
bilateral agreement negotiated between the United States and
the EC, as the 1992 Agreement did not provide any kind of rem-
edy and, therefore, proved not to be effective in solving the dis-
pute. Improving the implementation and compliance
circumstances would also take pressure off the WTO system and
'175 Kessie, supra note 361, at 145.
171; 1d. at 148.
'177 Bronckers & Van den Broek, sula note 268, at 114.
'178 1(. at 115.
.179 Van den Broek, supra note 246, at 138.
:8 Id. at 148.
38, Final Text of the Monaco Free Trade Agreement, available at http://
wwv.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreenen ts/Bilateral/Morocco-FTA/FInal-Text/Sec-
tionIndex.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
:'1, Bronckers & Van den Broek, supra note 268, at 118.
'183 Kessie, supra note 361, at 148.
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give other member nations more confidence in referring dis-
putes to the WTO, knowing they can be solved more effectively.
However, the recognition of retroactive financial compensation
will be a politically sensitive issue that needs to be introduced
carefully.
d. Greater Transparency in the Proceedings
In recent years, demands for greater transparency in the dis-
pute settlement system have become louder.38 4 The WTO needs
to create greater transparency in order to enhance public aware-
ness of non-compliance and the legitimacy of the dispute settle-
ment process in general. 5 Regarding the problems revolving
around Article 4.4 and 6.2 of the DSU and what must be stated
in the requests, "panels and the Appellate Body will need to es-
tablish a body of precedents to guide the parties on the level of
specificity that will suffice in their requests. '3 8 6 Alternatively, the
DSB could issue a document to the members that specifies the
level of detail required to raise a claim under each of the cov-
ered agreements; so that from the beginning there will be cer-
tainty about what parties are required to bring forward. 8 7
Generally, there should be an emphasis on improving the trans-
parency of the dispute settlement system as a whole.
B. NEGOTLATING AND DRAFTING A NEW AGREEMENT
Regardless of a possible decision made by the WTO, the par-
ties to the Airbus-Boeing dispute need to enter into a new agree-
ment governing subsidies because a decision by the WTO will
not completely solve the issue of aircraft subsidies. Even in the
case of WTO rulings, there is a need for more predictable rules
in the area of aircraft manufacturing so that future disputes can
be avoided.
The EC can no longer argue that launch aid is necessary to
protect its infant civil aviation industry, and Airbus has recog-
nized that it does not need launch aid for the development of
the A350. 8 Therefore, the European side should be willing to
discuss abolishing the use of launch aid all together. The
384 Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early
Settlement in the GATTI/WO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 158, 172 (2000);
Ehlermann, supra note 362, at 110; Feeney, supra note 117, at 111.
385 Van den Broek, supra note 246, at 151.
386 Cameron & Orava, supra note 362, at 220.
387 Id.
388 Boeing Seeks to Reopen Talks on State Aid, THE GUARDiAN, June 14, 2005, at 17.
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United States should then agree to discuss all forms of financial
aid provided to Boeing, especially indirect financial
assistance.389
Even after the WTO makes its rulings, it is not likely that sub-
sidies in the aircraft manufacturing sector will be totally aban-
doned. 90 Therefore, the goal of both parties should be to
create a level playing field. 9 ' What is needed is a system to de-
fine, limit, and monitor the government aid that both compa-
nies receive. 92 Making subsidies more transparent should be
the starting point for an agreement, and the basis for the new
agreement could be the definitions and framework of the WTO
subsidies rules.3 93
Most importantly, "all potential forms of subsidies should be
placed on the table. -94 More than in any other area, there is a
need for precision. "The new deal should contain provisions for
calculating the size and impact of subsidies .. .using interna-
tional accounting standards." '395 "A reduced ceiling on supports
should be negotiated" and the new agreement should also in-
clude "clearly defined penalties for a violation," which should be
supervised by an "independent overseer.""" 6 Finally, the new
agreement should also become a global one. Taking the multi-
lateral route by including, at a minimum, Brazil, Canada, Japan,
China, and Russia would ensure that no one would feel left out
in this central economic industry.
C. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
After showing that the WTO is not the proper place to settle
this case, the question arises whether there are any alternatives
to the WTO rendering rulings in this dispute. As United States
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said in a speech to the Eu-
ropean Parliament, "[w]e must be more creative in settling bilat-
eral disputes... Litigation is not always the solution for solving
'1s9 Barfield, supra note 309.
390 Flugzeughersteller-Clementfordert Kompromiss, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Sept. 6, 2005,
http://www.spiegel.de; ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 12.
391 Flugzeughersteller-Clementfordert Kompromiss, SPI ECLI ONLINE, Sept. 6, 2005,
http://www.spiegel.de.
3 2 Daniel Michaelis et. al., US, EU Agree to Aerospace Talks, WALL, ST. J., Jan. 12,
2005, at A2.
393 No More Subsidies for Either Boeing or Airbus, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH.,
Oct. 11, 2004, at 91; ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 11.
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395 Garten, supra note 200, at 9.
396 ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY, supra note 18, at 11.
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every problem. '397 The creation of an "expedited arbitral pro-
cess that can evaluate subsidy" programs could be considered
for settling this dispute. 9 The parties also might agree to arbi-
tration before a third-party from Asia or Latin America.3 99 Arbi-
tration allow the United States and Europe to handle their
toughest problems in a more cooperative way without having to
worry about the qualifications and independence of panelists at
the WTO; and they could start over by having talks in a com-
pletely new atmosphere. As a general framework, the rules of
the SCM Agreement could be applied to an arbitration
proceeding.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are numerous reasons why the WTO is not the appro-
priate forum to resolve the dispute between Airbus and Boeing.
In this long lasting controversy over aircraft subsidies, the
chances are very high that there will be rulings against both par-
ties. Hence, the best possible outcome would be that the parties
comply with the decision made by the WTO immediately, or
that they settle the controversy before the WTO issues a ruling.
In any case, the WTO's credibility must be maintained at all
cost, and all efforts need to be undertaken to prevent a damag-
ing trade war, in which everybody, including the WTO, would
lose.
One remaining question is whether the WTO will ever be
ready to decide such a "high-stakes" case. If the WTO decides
other pending "key" cases, such as the dispute over agricultural
subsidies, and if the suggested changes to the WTO dispute set-
tlement system are introduced, the WTO could approach "high-
stakes" cases in the future more readily and successfully. At the
present time, however, the likelihood of damage to the WTO
system by deciding its "toughest" case so far is too high, and this
case is more likely to do harm to the existing system than
strengthen the reputation of the WTO. As one commentator
has stated, "[t]his is a case the WTO [does] not want to hear."4 °
397 Int'l Trade Reporter, May 17, 2001, at 778.
398 D'Cruz & Gastle, supra note 226, at 6.
399 Garten, supra note 200, at 9.
4oo DanielDrezner.com, Boeing, Airbus, and the WTO, http://www.daniel
drezner.com/archives/001766.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2005).
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